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This study examines every reportedfederal district and appellate court
opinion between 1986-1995 involving sexual harassment in the workplace-nearly 650 opinions in all. The methodology is to code over 100
variablesfor each case in an "objective" manner, meaning that persons with
legal trainingshould not differ in the coding, and then to statistically analyze correlations and trends among variables. This method sef-consciously
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differsfrom the traditionallegal metlwd of analyzing leadingcases, and the
Article describes the distinctive features, benefits, and problems of this
method.
Among thefindings are that a disproportionatenumber ofplaintiffs are
blue-collar or clerical workers, although most cases arisefrom mixed rather

than sex-segregated workplaces. Most defendants are private employers, but
a disproportionatelylargefraction are government employers. Most cases involve harassment by supervisors rather than coworkers alone. Successful
cases are likely to involve sexualized conduct directed at individual victims.

Sexual harassment claims involving dfferentialbut nonsexualconduct and

conduct demeaning to women in general arefar less successfiutl Cilicalfactorsfor a successful case are that the victim complained within the organization and that the employer had established no formal process to deal with

sexual harassment issues.
INTRODUCTION

How do sexual harassment claims fare in the federal courts?
What facts and issues do the federal courts face. What circumstances
make a successful claim? Have things changed over time? Are the
horror stories true? Do courts find employers liable for a single joke
or sexual story? Although widespread sexual harassment has existed
for decades, and litigation has proceeded for over twenty years, de-

tailed knowledge about these issues is still lacking.
This Article presents the first systematic study of sexual harassment cases in the federal courts. 2 We have read and analyzed accord1 The case of Macenzie v. MillerBrewing, 608 N.V.2d 331 (Wis. App. 2000). received
much media attention. Known as the "Seinfeld" case, the plaintiff in Mackenzie was fired
for recounting the plot line of a Seinfidd episode. Id. at 336. When a coworker complained
of harassment based on this recounting, Mackenzie was fired. He sued for xwTongful termination. The district court dismissed the claim, id., and the appellate court affirmed, id. at
361.
2 Studies or overviews which address the legal system tend to concentrate on one
area such as a particular state, federal district, or wvithin a particular year. S, e.g., Nancy L
Abell, et al., Recent Developments in Sexual HarassmentLitigation, C902 ALI-ABA 637 (1994)

(reviewing facts and holdings of federal and California sexual harassment cases for 1993),
availabe atWL C902 ALI-ABA 637; Frances S. Coles, Forced to Quit: Sexual Harassment Complaints andAgency Response 14 SEx RoLxs 81 (1986) (examining eighty-eight cases filed ith
California State Fair Employment and Housing Department between 1979 and 1983);John
F. Dickinson & Richard N. Margulies, Employent Discritnination,41 NMfc: L RE%, 1303
(1990) (surveying significant sexual discrimination cases by the Eleventh Circuit for the
1989judicial year); Ven E. Hauck & Thomas G. Pearce, Sexual Harasment and Arbitration,
43 LaB. LJ. 31 (1992) (revi-ing 100 labor arbitration awards in sexual harassment cases);
Lynn BrundageJongleux, Developments in Employmen tDiscriminationLaw, 20 L%'N.
L RE%, 243
(1987) (surveying recent developments in Seventh Circuit employment discrimination
law); J. Ren6 Josey, Labor and Employment, 36 S.C. L REv. 179 (1985) (surveying South
Carolina labor and employment law); Barbara A. Lee, Discrimination Against Students in
HigherEducation:A Review of the 1996JudialDedcsions,24J.C. & U.L 619 (1998) (revieing
discrimination cases brought by college students in the 1996judicial year); Elaine Massock,
Survey ofllinoisLaw: Emplo'ment Law, 22 S. ILu. U. UJ. 841 (1998) (reieving 1997 employ-

550

CORNELL LAW REVEW

[Vol. 86:548

ing to quantifiable factors every reported federal district court and
appellate court opinion on sexual harassment in the workplace from
3
1986 to 1996-a total of nearly 650 opinions.
These 650 cases comprise only a fraction of sexual harassment
litigation, 4 and an even smaller fraction of all workplace incidences of

sexual harassment.5 Complaints continue to pour into the Equal Emment decisions in Illinois); Patricia L. Ogden, Survey of Laborand Employment Law Developmentsfor IndianaPractitioners,31 IND. L. REv. 567 (1998) (reviewing labor and employment
decisions in Indiana and the Seventh Circuit); Ramona L. Paetzold & Anne M. O'Leary.
Kelly, Continuing Violations and Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment: When is Enough,
Enough, 31 Am. Bus. LJ. 365 (1993) (reviewing cases discussing the continuing violation
exception to the statute of limitations).
In addition, academics have performed empirical studies on other aspects of Title VIL
See, e.g., Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical
Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases ChallengingJob Segregation, 59 U. Ct. L,
REv. 1073 (1992) (reporting empirical study of the judicial response to the lack of interest
defense in the context of job segregation cases); Richard C. Sorenson et al., Solving the
Chronic Problem of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: An Empirical Study of Factors 4ffecting
Employee Perceptions and Consequences of Sexual Harassment, 34 CAL. V. L. REv. 457 (1998)
(examining factors that influence how sexual behavior is perceived by "reasonable" people); Julie A. Springer et al., Survey of Selected Evidentiary Issues in Employment Law Litigation,
50 BAYLOR L. REv. 415 (1998) (surveying law on evidentiary issues in employment litigation); see also Maya Alexandri, Note, The Student Summer Associate Experience with Harassing
Behaviors:An EmpiricalStudy and Proposalfor PrivateParty Action, 19 VOMEN's RTs. L. RP. 43
(1997) (analyzing summer associates' experiences with sexual harassment); Donna Shestowsky, Note, Where is the Common Knowledge? EmpiricalSupportfor RequiringExpert Testimony
in Sexual Harassment Trials,51 STAN. L. REv. 357 (1999) (examining the need for expert
testimony in sexual harassment trials).
3 See infra Part I for a description of the database.
4
See David N. Laband & Bernard F. Lentz, The Effects of Sexual Harassmenton Job Satisfaction, Earnings, and TurnoverAmong Female Lawyers, 51 INDUS. & LAB. REL. Rzv. 594, 594
(1998) ("[Slexual harassment... [c]omplaints filed with the [EEOC] have skyrocketed
during the past ten years."); Cathy Jones, Set Policy on Sexual Harassment is Best Protection,
DALLAS Bus.J.,Jan. 15, 1999, at 37 ("[S]exual harassment claims have increased... [and]
... [t]his upward trend is expected to continue."); AmyJoyce, An Alternative Sexual Harassment Poliy: Insurance,WASH. PosT, May 17, 1998, at H4 ("Employee discriminatory claims
have nearly quadrupled in the past four years.. . ."); Albert R. Karr, Work Week, WALt Sr.J.,
Dec. 29, 1998, at Al ("[D]iscrimination complaints filed with the (EEOC] keep climbing
... [to] ... over 16,000 sexual-harassment cases [expected] in 1998, up from 6,883 in
1991."); Andre Mouchard, Experts: Fewer Harassat Work, ORANGE Coumy Rgo., Feb. 10,
1996, at C1 ("Complaints about sexual harassment are on the rise."); N.H. SeesJump in Sex
Complaints, BoSrON GLOBE, May 20, 1996, at 23 ("[G]reater awareness is responsible for a
30 percent increase in the number of sexual harassment complaints filed in New Hampshire in the past year."); Elizabeth Shogren, Sex HarassmentMessage Often Unheeded, Many
Women Contend, LA. TiMEs, Sept. 12, 1995, at DI ("[U]nwelcome passes, groping and sexually offensive comments are still rampant in the workplace."). But see Don Lee, Complaints
of Sex HarassmentDecline in State, LA. Timzs, Oct. 14, 1996, at Al (reporting that the number of sexual harassment allegations filed with the state Department of Fair Employment
and Housing dropped 3%, ending over a decade of consecutive increases).
5 See BARBARA A. Gurx, SEx AND THE WORKPLACE 46 tbl.2 (1985) (reporting that
53.1% of the women in a study identified themselves as victims of sexual harassment): U.S.
MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., SExuAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLAcE, TRENDS, PROGREss,
CONTINUING CHALLENGES 13 (1995) (explaining that 42% of women in a study of federal

employees in 1980 reported having experienced harassing behavior compared with 42% in
1987 and 44% in 1994); Claire Safran, What Men Do to Women on theJob: A Shocking Look at
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ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 6 and litigation in state
and federal courts continues to increase. 7 Our set of cases is high up
on the naming-blaming-claiming litigation pyramid. 8 We doubt that
SexualHarassmen4RroDBoOi, Nov. 1976, at 149, 217 (reporting that nearly 90% of the 9000
women that responded to readers' questionnaire entitled, "How Do You Handle Sex on
the Job?" had personally experienced sexual harassment in the workplace ranging from
"leering and ogling" to overt requests for sexual favors).
6 In 1990, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission received 6000 sexual
harassment complaints. U.S. EQuAL F-PLOYhMtNr OpPxOrurn' Co.st'.v, Tn-xus is IRASSMENT CHARGES Fami wrr Tm EEOC DURLING THE 1980s AND 1990s, availableat http://
www.eeoc.gov/stats/harassment-html (last modifiedJuly 11, 2000). Beginning in 1995 and
continuing through 1998, the EEOC received over 15,000 sexual harassment complaints.
U.S. EQuAL EmpLOyENT OPPORTuNrry CO MI'N SEXUAL HARnss N-r CHARGEs, EEOC &
FEPAs Co.mInw: FY 1992 - FY 1998, available at http://v.eeoc.gov/stats/harass.html
(last modifiedJan. 12, 2000) [hereinafter EEOC Report]; see also Elizabeth Grossman, Aational Women Law Students Association Conferene, Afardt 1, 1996: Written Remaris on W lence
Against Women, 11 Wis. WomN's LJ. 395, 399 (1997) ("The number of sexual harassment
charges filed at EEOC has increased by 112o since 1989 .... Sexual harassment charges
now represent more than 12% of total charges, compared to 6% five years ago."). Victims
who wish to sue in court must first file a charge with the Commission and receive either a
"right to sue" notice or a decision by the Commission not to proceed on the charge. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1994).
7 See Mary Chlopecki & Ellen Duffy McKay, The DollarImpact of the 1991 Civil Rights
Act HR Focus, Sept. 1997, at 15 (stating that data maintained by the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts shows that an excess of 23,000 employment-related lawsuits
were filed in 1996, nearly triple from 1991, which was due in part to Civil Rights Act of
1991);JohnJ. Donohue I & Peter Siegelman, The ChangingNature ofEmployment Diseimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L REv. 983, 987 (1991) (suggesting that employment discrimina-

tion cases increase at a rate of 344 cases per year); Mark Hansen, Study ShowsJob Bias

Changin, A.BA.J., May 1991, at 34 (reporting that "[tihe number of employmentdacrimination cases in the federal courts rose almost 2,200 percent in the past two decades, nearly
10 times the rate of all other civil litigation combined"); Richard C. Nfariani, Management
Strategies to Deal with Today's Rh4 N.J. LJ., May 13, 1996, at 11 ("The number of emplo-

ment discrimination cases in the federal courts has increased by more than 2,000 percent
in the past 20 years. It is estimated that the number of discrimination cases filed in the
federal courts wll continue to grow at an annual rate of about 10 percent."); Gerald D.
Skoning, FederalJudiciaryReluctantPersonnelCzar CHI. Trm.,July 3, 1997, at N23 ("Over the
past five years, employment discrimination cases filed in federal court have increased at an
annual rate as high as 33 percent."); see also Marc Galanter, Case Congregationsand Their
Careers,24 Lkw & Soc'y REv. 371,373-76 (1990) (stating that types of litigation increase or
decrease at the same rate as the "underlying activity" that encourages that litigation); Carol
Kleiman, Winning StrategiesforAvoiding Bias Suits CHI. Tam., Aug. 10, 1994, at C5 (stating
that since the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990, there has been a 22%
increase in employment discrimination claims).
8 The process of resolving grievances has been described as a pyramid. &e David M.
Trubek et al., The Costs of OrdinaryLitigation, 31 UCLA L REv. 72, 86-87 (1983). In this
pyramid, grievances ("blaming") form the bottom layer of the pyramid, follovw ed by claims.
Id. Claims for which redress is not granted become "disputes." Id. At the top layers of the
pyramid are those disputes which result in court filings and finally, those filings that result
in some sort ofjudicial intervention and opinion. Id.; see also William LF. Felstiner et al.,
The Emergence and TransformationofDisputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming.... 15 LA'w & Soe'v
REv. 631, 635-36 (1981) (describing the stages by which an experience is transformed from
naming ("saying to oneself that a particular experience has been injurious"), to blaming ('a
person attributes an injury to the fault of another individual or social entity"), to claiming
("when someone with a grievance voices it to the person or entity believed to be responsible and asks for some remedy")).
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the federal cases in our database accurately reflect the workplace. Indeed, a major theme in our inquiry is the degree to which the published cases present a different picture from that seen by social
science researchers surveying the workplace or from the public perception of sexual harassment litigation.
On the other hand, our 650 cases are substantially larger than the
number of cases legal scholars, who tend to focus on the leading
cases, typically examine. In other words, we do not focus exclusively
on the tip of the litigation pyramid. Another theme we explore is the
degree to which the leading cases are typical or distorted representations of the sweep of federal sexual harassment cases.
In Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,10 for example, the court
found that pornographic pinups contributed to the harassment of
Lois Robinson." JacksonvilleShipyards stimulated an ongoing scholarly
debate over the intersection (or collision) between Title VII protections and the First Amendment. In another notorious case involving
disturbing love letters, Ellison v. Brady,12 the Ninth Circuit adopted a
"reasonable woman" standard, judging the offensiveness of alleged
harassment from the perspective of a "reasonable woman" rather than
a "reasonable person." I3 This decision prompted an outpouring of
critical commentary on the wisdom of adopting or rejecting the rea14
sonable woman standard.
In addition to these leading appellate court opinions, the Stipreme Court cases inevitably become leading cases. In Meritor Savings
Bank, FSB v. Vinson,15 the Supreme Court first recognized sexual harassment as a violation of Title VII.16 In Hanis v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,17
the Court held that the plaintiff could bring a sexual harassment
9 Very few instances of sexual harassment reach litigation. See Danielle Foulls &
Marita P. McCabe, Sexual Harassment:FactorsAffectingAttitudes and Perceptions, 37 SEx RoLE~s
773, 775 (1997) (noting that "only 1-7% of people who experience sexual harassment file
formal complaints"); see alsoJeanne Henry & Julian Meltzoff, Perceptions of Sexual Harassment as a Function of Target's Response Type and Observer's Sex, 39 Sax RoTEs 253, 255-56

(1998) (explaining that many women choose to ignore harassing conduct rather than to
confront or report it); Sharon Toffey Shepcla & Laurie L. Levesque, Poisoned Waters: Sexual
Harassment and the College Climate, 38 SEx RoLEs 589, 590 (1998) (discussing the fact that
sexual harassment is often not recognized or labeled as sexual harassment because offensive conduct occurs so frequently within academic environments).
10 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
11 Id. at 1524-27. Although often overlooked in the debate overJacksonvilleShipyards,
the plaintiff in that case testified not only to the presence of graffiti but also "about comments of a sexual nature she recalled hearing... from coworkers." Id. at 1498.
12 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
13 Id. at 879.
14 See infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
15 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
16

Id. at 73.

17

510 U.S. 17 (1993).
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claim without necessarily showing serious psychological harm.' 8 More
recently, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,19 the Court upheld a male employee's complaint of sexual harassment by male supervisors and coworkers.2 0 The Court reported that the conduct
involved "sex-related, humiliating actions" including physical assault
and threatened rape,2 ' but in the "interest of both brevity and dignity"
declined to describe the precise details.2 2 Finally, the Court recently
sought to clarify the standards for employer liability in a pair of sexual
harassment cases. In Faragherv. City ofBoca Raton,2 3 a female lifeguard
complained about physical touchings and offensive comments by her
supervisors. 2 4 The Court held that an employer is subject to vicarious
liability for a hostile environment created by a supervisor unless the
employer can show "that [it] exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and... that the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to
avoid harm othenvise."2 The companion case of BurlingtonIndustries,
Inc. v. Ellerth 6 involved "boorish and offensive remarks" about a

worker's clothing and breasts, including never-carried-out threats to
deny her a promotion and other tangible job benefits.2 7 The Court
held that, because hostile environment cases require a showing of severe or pervasive conduct the labels "quid pro quo" or "hostile environment" were relevant in determining whether discrimination exists
but did not control the analysis of employer liability once a finding of
28
discrimination is made.
The present study goes beyond these leading cases and their fact
patterns. In broadening the traditional analytical legal approach, we
have foregone the ability to examine the nuances of particular cases
and doctrinal debates among judges. However, we have gained perspective on the bulk of the issues and fact patterns with which federal
judges wrestle. These fact patterns inform judges about sexual harassment, who in turn create sexual harassment laws (within, of course,
18

19
20

21
22

Id. at 22.
523 U.S. 75 (1998).
Id. at 82.
Id. at 77.
I. The lower courts were less circumspect. The Fifth Circuit noted that the actions

in question included restraining the victim while another coworker put his penis on the

victim's neck, and pushing a bar of soap into the victim's anus. Oncale v. Sundoimer
Offshore Sers., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118-19 (5th Cir. 1996).
23
524 U.S. 775 (1998).

27

Id. at 780.
I&at 807.
524 U.S. 742 (1998).
I, at 747.

28

Id. at

24
25
26

751.
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the broad parameters laid out by Congress). This sweep of cases,
then, presents a particularly important perspective.
After describing the study in Part I, we sketch a portrait of sexual
harassment cases in the federal courts in Part II. We describe the
plaintiffs (e.g., sex, occupation, employment status, the number of
plaintiffs suing together), the defendants (e.g., private business or
government, coworker or supervisor, the number of harassers), and
alleged harassment (e.g., verbal or physical, directed at the plaintiff
specifically or all women).
In Part Im, we examine success rates for district court plaintiffs.
Stated quite simply, the horror stories are not true. Our findings do
not support the claims that plaintiffs succeed on cases alleging mere
jokes or a single incident of allegedly harassing behavior. Here we
conclude that successful claims involve allegations of physical harassment and verbal harassment of a sexual nature directed at the plaintiff. The existence, or lack thereof, of a grievance program greatly
affects the employer's liability as does the employer's prior knowledge
of the harassment.
In Part IV, we compare our findings for the district courts with
those for the appellate courts. Our study shows that Title VII plaintiffs
are as successful as other plaintiffs in appellate courts.
In Part V, we look at trends over time. Interestingly, the claims
and success rates did not dramatically change after the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, nor after the 1993 Supreme Court decision in Harrisv. Forklift
29
Systems, Inc.
Finally, in Part VI, we examine three important issues in sexual
harassment cases that are reflected in the commentary: the presence
of pornography in the workplace as a violation of Title VII; the reasonable woman standard; and the conceptualization of sexual harassment. First, many commentators analyzing the implications of sexual
harassment have focused on pornography in the workplace. Our
study shows that although pornography in the workplace implicates
important First Amendment issues, few cases in our study involved
pornography in the absence of other claims. Second, a relatively
small number of courts mention the reasonable woman standard but
when courts do mention the standard, plaintiffs have a higher success
rate than in cases where courts mention the reasonable person
standard.
Third, there is an ongoing debate among legal scholars over the
conceptualization of sexual harassment. 30 As Professors Katherine M.
29 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (holding that sexual harassment claim does not require
showing of psychological harm).
30 See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudenceof Sexual Harassment,83 CORNELL L,

REv. 1169 (1998); Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111

HARv.

L,
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Franke and Kathiyn Abrams describe the debate, this is the "why"
question of sexual harassment-why is sexual harassment a violation
of Title VII?3 1 After describing the recent work of four scholars, we
conclude that our findings support the critique that courts view sexual
harassment too narrowly. Specifically, courts have failed to recognize

the harms of harassment aimed at women as a group and have failed
to acknowledge harassment premised upon nonsexual behavior. We
base this conclusion on two of our most important findings: first,
plaintiffs alleging individual conduct are more successful than plaintiffs alleging group conduct; and second, plaintiffs alleging sexual harassment based on comments or behavior of a sexual nature are more
successful than plaintiffs basing their claims on nonsexual, although
32
sexist, behavior.
I
TnE

DATA AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

This study includes a comprehensive analysis of every federal district and appellate court opinion on sexual harassment in the employment context3 3 for the ten-year period following Meitor Savings Bank,
FSB v. Vinson,34 the first Supreme Court opinion to recognize sexual
harassment as a violation of Title VII.3s Importantly, our period spans
445 (1997); Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?,49 SrT,,. L
691 (1997); Vicki Schultz, Reconaeptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 Yu.x LJ. 1683
(1998).
31 Franke, supranote 30, at 691 ("What exactly is wrrong with sexual harassment? Why
is it sex discrimination?").
32 By "nonsexual, although sexist" behavior, we mean less favorable work assignments,
lack of training opportunities, etc.
REv.
REv.

33

Sexual harassment has been studied in many other nonworkplace contexts. See,

eg., Michelle Adams, Knowing Your Plae TheorizingSexual Harassment at Home, 40 Amz. L
Rxv. 17 (1998) (discussing sexual harassment of women by men occurring in or around
the home where threat to home exists, such as between a landlord and tenant); C)nthia
Grant Bowman, Street Harassmentand the Informal Gliltoiationof Momen, 106 HArw L RE%,
517 (1993) (addressing the harassment women face while they are traveling or in public
places); Martha Chamallas, The New GenderPanie"Reflections on Sex Scandals and the Militay,
83 Miqex. L REV. 305 (1998) (discussing the problem of sexual harassment and sexual
assault in the military); Maureen 0. Nash, Student on Student Sexual Harassment:If Schoos Are
Liable; What About the Parents?,31 CRIGTrroN L REv. 1131 (1998) (reviewing current case
law on peer sexual harassment, its implications for schools and the liability of the offenders' parents); Gail Sorenson, Commentary, Peer Sexual Harassment: Remedies and Guiddines
Under Federal Law, 92 EDUC. L REP. 1 (1994) (investigating peer harassment in public
schools); David P. Thompson & A'Lann Truelock, Commentar)y Student-to-Student Sexual
Harassment: Sifting Through the Wrckage 125 EDUC. L RnE. 1035 (1998) (discussing peerinflicted sexual harassment, its treatment in federal courts, and the liability of schools
under Title IX).
34 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
35

Id. at 66.
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the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 3 6 which gave plaintiffs
in sexual harassment suits the right to jury trials and compensatory
and punitive damages.3 7 Part of our charge, then, is to detect possible
changes in litigation patterns after 1991.
Our strategy for finding cases was straightforward. We conducted
searches on the federal courts database in Westlaw and Lexis using

the command "sex! w/3 (haras! or harrasl)". Although this broad
search produced many cases that did not involve sexual harassment in
employment, it gave us 502 useable district court opinions and 164

appellate court opinions.38 Of these, only 263 district court cases and
126 appellate cases are officially "published" in the West reporter sys-

tem.3 9 Thus, our database is substantially larger than "published"
opinions as judges use that term. Student research assistants read
each case and filled out a coding sheet of some 106 questions. 40

Our data have certain inherent limitations. First, we reiterate
that we only study cases in which ajudge has written an opinion. This
necessarily excludes the vast majority of sexual harassment situations. 41 As commentators have noted, "most disputes are resolved
without a filing [of a claim]. "42 Most filed cases are settled or
dropped, 43 and these are not in our universe of cases. Additionally,

we only include federal cases, even though Title VII claims may be
36 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
37 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b), (c) (1994); see also DAVID CATHCART xr AL., THE CIVIL RIGHTS
AcT OF 1991, at 180-81 (1993) (noting that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 authorized compensatory and punitive damages originally not authorized under Title VII).
38 The initial search identified cases in which the phrase "sexual harassment" was
mentioned anywhere in the opinion, a list that was more than twice as long as the final
database. Of this larger set, we first determined whether the opinion involved a claim
under Title VII alleging sexual harassment and, if so, whether the opinion provided
enough details to complete the coding sheet. The coding sheet does not allow for the
same suit to be tracked throughout the system. In other words, we coded each opinion
produced in the same suit as a separate case at both the district court and appellate court
level.

39

The proportion of published opinions in our appellate database (110/148, or

74%) is substantially higher than in our district-court database (261/503, or 52%). Because district court decisions address claims at every stage of the proceeding and many of
their ruling have little precedential value, district courtjudges often choose not to officially
report decisions.
40 The coding sheet for appellate cases contains the same substantive questions as the
coding sheet for district court cases. However, the procedural questions are different.
41 See supra note 9.
42 Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD.L. Ry. 3, 7 (1986)
(citing Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes:Assessing the Adversaiy Culture; 15 LAw & Soc'y REy. 525 (1981)); Miller & Sarat, supa, at 543 ("Few disputants (11.2 percent) report taking their dispute to court.").
43 See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know
(And Think We Know) About OurAllegedly Contentiousand Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. Ray. 4,
26 (1983) ("Many cases are withdrawn or abandoned.. . ."). Galanter also notes that
"most civil cases in American courts are settled." Id. at 27.
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pursued in state court and many states have enacted their own versions of Title VII.44 Finally, we only studyjudicial opinions, which may
45
not be a random sample of all judicial decisions.
Second, we must recognize our own limitations in interpreting
the cases and turning them into machine-readable, mostly binary vari-

ables. Although some coding error is inevitable when dealing with
large data sets, 46 such error is not likely to be a serious source of misinterpretation because any error would be random. For example, we
are as likely to miscode a man as a woman and vice versa, and such
errors cancel one another out over enough cases.
The goal was to keep vagaries in interpreting cases to a minimum.
Most legal scholarship-including the best scholarship examining sexual harassment cases-examines the dozen or so leading cases. Scholars interpret and translate the judges' words, trying to assess nuances
of meaning, arguing that the judges implied something while saying
44 See .g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a (West 1995 & Supp. 2000); Kv RE%. STAT.
ArNN. §§ 344.010-.990 (Banks-Baldin 1999); MirN. STAT. Axx. §§ 363.01-.03 (Vest 1991 &
Supp. 2000); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4112.01-99 (Anderson 1998 & Supp. 1999); Tx.
LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.001-.306 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2000). These human rights statutes
have been identified by their respective state and circuit courts as analogous to their federal counterpart, Title VII. See Wathen v. Gen. Elec. Co., 1997 FED App. 176P, 115 F.3d
400, 403-04 n.5 (6th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he general purpose of the Kentucky Act is to provide a
means for implementing within the state the policies embodied in Title N11... (and]
substantive legal analysis for the present claims brought under Title VII and the Kentucky
Civil Rights Act is identical."); Brittell v. Dep't of Corr., 717 A.2d 1254, 1264 (Conn. 1998)
(noting that Title VII is the "federal statutory counterpart" to Connecticut's human rights
statute);Johns v. Harborage I, Ltd., 585 N.W.2d 853, 860 (Minn. App. 1998) ("Minnesota
courts have recognized that principles developed in federal Title VII cases are instructive
and may be applied when interpreting [Minnesota's Human Rights Act]."); Ohio Civl
Rights Comm'n v. David Richard Ingram, D.C. Inc., 630 N.E.2d 669, 672 (Ohio 1994)
(analogizing Title VII to Ohio's human rights statute in sexual harassment claims); Graves
v. Komet, 982 S.W.2d 551,554 n.1 (Tex. App. 1998) ("Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code
was enacted for the purpose, among others, of executing the policies of its federal counterpart, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.. ").
45 See Theodore Eisenberg & StewartJ. Schwab, Mhat Shapes Pecteptions of the Federal
Court SystemP, 56 U. Cm. L Rzv. 501 (1989) (examining different perspectives of the federal court system arising from published appellate opinions, filed appeals, and district
court filings); Susan M. Olson, Studying FederalDistridct Courts Through Published Cas:s A Iesearch Note, 15 Jusr. Sis. J. 782 (1992) (concluding that the process of reporting district
court cases makes published cases a questionable sample for social science research because published district court cases are not representative of a court's entire caseload);
Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, Studying the Icrbregfrom Its 77p: A Comparison of
Published and UnpublishedEmployment DiscriminationCases, 24 Lmw & Soc'v REv. 1133, 1144
(1990) (cautioning legal analysts that focusing on published opinions alone, w hich represent less than fifteen percent of employment discrimination complaints filed, ill yield
skewed results because published and unpublished opinions diverge in systematic and important ways).
46 We established various controls to limit keypunch and related errors. All cases
were keypunched twice with automatic notification if the repeated case had any different
data. Thus, a keypunch slip would have to occur tice in the same -wayfor the same variable in the same case for us not to catch it.
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something else. In addition, the scholarship usually has a heavy normative approach, criticizing judges when they stray from the appropriate framework or results. By contrast, we try to shift the analysis for
interpreting the individual case to interpreting the range of cases.
The unit of observation is the individual case, but we try to analyze it
in an "objective" manner.
We do this through an approach of "coding" rather than "interpreting" cases. The sweep of our variables can be seen from Appendix
A. Typical questions include the following: Did the harassment occur
at work? Is the employer private or government? Did the supervisor
know of the conduct? Did the harassment include touching the victims? We designed our variables so that sophisticated legal readers of
a case would agree on how it should be coded. One of the methodological innovations of the present study is to provide a measure of
"objective questions." For now, we report our conclusion that we are
confident that our variables are "objective" in the sense that welltrained legal professionals should reach the same answers in most
cases.
An interesting limitation of our data derives from missing observations in some cases. Our information comes from what the judges
decide to tell us about the cases, and it comes with all the blinders and

biases of the bench job.47 For example, we find that in all cases when
we can identify race, nearly three times as many involve minority
plaintiffs as white plaintiffs. 48 We do not interpret this statistic as suggesting that victims of color are more common than white plaintiffs in
the reported decisions. Rather, we suspect that judges simply do not
mention the race of the victim when she is white. 49 It is more salient
47 See Jane B. Baron & Julia Epstein, Is Law Narrative?, 45 BuFF. L. Rxv. 141, 142
(1997) ("Judicial opinions select from among the many facts adduced at trial those 'relevant' to what is deemed to be the case's issue to construct a statement of the case; the
resulting rendition of 'the facts' can thus be seen as a story crafted to support the court's
holding."). Baron and Epstein further note that "[w]ere the issue framed differently, or
were the court to reach a different result, different facts might be selected, and another
story told." Id.; see also Richard K Sherwin, The NarrativeConstruction ofLegal Reality, 18 VT.
L. REv. 681, 684 (1994) ("Increasingly scholars are realizing the inescapability of storytelling and the diverse ways in which narratives construct what we regard as truth and
reality.").
Storytelling has merit not only within the context of the judicial opinion, but also as it
relates to victims' perceptions of harassment and what constitutes harassment. See Daniel
A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45
STAN. L. REv. 807, 809-10 (1993) (discussing legal storytelling as it applies to critical race
theory and feminist theory and noting that diverse experiences affect the storyteller's perception of the situation, including what constitutes sexual harassment).
48 Of the identifiable district court plaintiffs, forty-five are black, twelve Hispanic,
three Asian, one is Native American, and twenty-one are white. In the courts of appeals, ten
plaintiffs are black, six are Hispanic, and eight are white.
49 We considered the hypothesis that the courts mentioned the plaintiff's race only
because the plaintiff had also brought a race discrimination or racial hostile environment
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when the victim is black, and that makes the judge more likely to re°

port it.5
The judicial opinion is the judge's story justifying the judgment.

The cynical legal realist might say that the facts the judge chooses to
relate are inherently selective and a biased subset of the actual facts of
the case. This is an overstatement, but it is instructive. For example,
an important issue for us is whether the employer had in place an
antiharassment program, and the degree to which the existence of
such a program affects liability. It is no surprise that when we know
(because the judge reported it) that an employer did not have a program, plaintiffs are more successful (71% win rates versus the overall
51%). Correspondingly, in cases where we know (again, because the
judge reported it) that the employer had either a general grievance
program or a specific antiharassment program, plaintiffs are not successful (41% and 50% win rates, respectively).51 But in 353 cases we
do not know whether the employers had a formal program. Why
didn't the judge give us this information? The cynic would say that in
some cases the judge decides to rule for the employer, and then has to
write an opinion justifying the decision. If the employer had an antiharassment program in place, this is a fact worth mentioning. If the
employer did not have such a program in place, the judge keeps silent. In cases in which the judge decides to rule for the employee, the
same factors cut in the opposite way in determining whether thejudge
mentions the presence or absence of the antiharassment program. It
remains a tricky question whether the presence or absence of an an-

tiharassment program affects the judicial decision or simply is part of
the judicial reporting of the decision in certain cases.
In short, we must be sophisticated and somewhat tentative in the
conclusions we reach. Nevertheless, we are enthusiastic about the
data set and the potential insights it can bring into litigated sexual
harassment cases. With our methodology and its reliance on "objective" coding, we do not reject issues of interpretation. Rather, we welclaim, but we concluded that this is only a partial explanation at best. In the eighty-two
cases that mention the plaintiff's race, only thirty include some type of race or nationalorigin discrimination claim.
50 Professor Eskridge, writing about Lon Fuller's famous "judicial" opinions in the

"Speluncean Explorers" case, noted that Fuller never referred to the race of any of the
participants: "[tihere is no explicit due of any sort as to the race of any participant. That is,
itself, an implicit due. In the 1940s, it went without saying that you were white if your race
was not noted." William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: TwendtehCentuy Statutory Intepreationin aNutshd4 61 GEO. WAsH. L REv. 1731, 1750 n.111 (1993);
see alsoDavid L Shapiro, Foreword.A Cave Drawingfortiw Ages, 112 HARV. L Rxv. 1834, 1835
n.7 (1999) (noting the failure of the hypothetical justices to mention the race of any of the
participants (citing Eskridge, supra)). We suspect that the implication of such silence remains true in the sexual harassment opinions of the 1980s and 1990s.
51 Hereinafter, data reported are reflected in Appendix A unless othenise noted.
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come them. Certainly other commentators may interpret our results
in different ways. Our main objective has been to push issues of interpretation from the usual arena (what does this case mean?) to a
broader one (what does the sweep of cases reveal?).
II
DisTRar

A.

COURT RESULTS

The Plaintiff

We were not surprised to find that the vast majority of the plaintiffs are women. Only 5.4% of the plaintiffs (a total of twenty-seven)
are men, a lower percentage than reported in the Merit Systems Protection Board study.52 Another nine cases had at least one male plaintiff as well as female plaintiffs. Usually these cases involved a husband
joining a state tort claim with his wife's harassment claim. Most of the
victims had left the workplace by the time the lawsuit started.5 3 However, 11% of the victims were still employed by the employer at the
time the lawsuit began.
The plaintiffs' marital status also raises issues of selective factual
reporting in judicial opinions. Among the cases where we could ascertain the plaintiff's marital status, we found that 53% of our plaintiffs
were married, 14% were divorced, and 34% were single.5 4 This finding is consistent with the general workforce statistics 55 which indicates

that 58% of the 1997 working labor force was married. The U.S. Merit
Systems Protection Board found, however, that unmarried employees
are more likely to be victims of sexual harassment than are those who
are married. 5 6 One might expect, then, that the proportion of married sexual harassment plaintiffs should be less than in the general
52 U.S. MExrr Sys. PROT. BD., supra note 5, at 14 (stating that 37% of women and 14%
of men reported experiencing harassing behavior); see also EEOC REPoRr, supra note 6
(reporting that between 1992 and 1998, men filed between 9.1% and 12.9% of sexual
harassment charges).
53 This finding is generally in line with a 1979 survey which found that 24% of sexual
harassment victims were fired for complaining about the conduct at issue; another 42% left
jobs when they felt harassed. The Impact of Sexual Harassmenton theJob: A Profile of the Exper.
ienees of 92 Women, REs. SERms REP. No. 3 (Working Women's Inst.) (1979).
54 These percentages were calculated without including the following categories: "single living with boyfriend," "widowed" and "missing/can't tell." Of the 123 participants,
sixty-six were married, eighteen were divorced, and thirty-nine were single.
55 See Current LaborStatistics, MOmHLy LAB. Rxv., Fall 1999, at 87 (indicating that the
U.S. Dept. of Labor Statistics report that 58% of the working labor force was "married with
spouse present" in 1997).
56 See U.S. MERrr Sys. PROT. BD., supra note 5, at 17; see also Becky L. Glass, Workplace
Harassmentand the Victimization of Women, 11 WomxEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 55, 59 (1988) (noting
that harassing behavior is more likely to be targeted at women who are younger, never
married, or divorced).
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workforce. 5 7 A possible explanation lies within the 75% of cases in
which marital status was unascertainable. We suspect that the "actual"
percentage of married victims in our cases is lower than the percentage reported because ajudge may find marriage particularly relevant
in discussing a sex harassment case and be more inclined to mention
it than when the person is single.
Somewhat surprisingly, the bulk of the plaintiffs are clerical or
blue collar, rather than workers in higher-status occupations. One
might hypothesize that high-status victims have more resources to
bring a federal lawsuit, and thus professional women should comprise
a higher fraction of all plaintiffs in comparison to their representation
in the workforce. We found, however, that the range of occupations
in our cases tracked the overall workforce quite closely. Where occupation status of the plaintiff could be identified, 12% of the plaintiffs
were professional 58 (as compared to 16% of the workforce), over a
quarter (29%) of the victims were clerical workers (as compared to
29% of the workforce), and 38% of the plaintiffs we could classify
were blue collar (40% of the workforce).*59 Management and whitecollar workers represent 21% of the plaintiffs in the study but entail
15% of the workforce. The occupation of the plaintiff was reported in
90% of the cases, so differential reporting patterns is unlikely to be an
explanation.
B.

Representation

We looked to see if public interest groups such as the American
Civil Liberties Union or the National Women's Law Center are involved in these cases. Despite the high media profile of such
groups, 60 less than 2% of the cases had any public interest group in-

volvement. Public interest groups were a party in two district court
cases, represented plaintiffs as counsel in five cases, and participated
as amicus in one other case. In addition, the EEOC was the plaintiff in
57 Fifty-eight percent of the married population won while only 39% of both divorced
and single groups won.
58 These percentages do not include the fifty-two cases where data were missing or
readers could not tell.
59 For the workforce statistics, see Bureau of Labor Household Data Annual Averages
(May 22, 2000) (reporting 1999 data), availableat ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/

If/AAT9.TXT.

60 See Kirk Mitchell, Woman Claims PrivateGuards Assaulted Her,DEmmRva Posr, Mar. 2,
1999, at 1B (noting the ACLU's recent lawsuit against the "nation's largest private prisoner-

transport company"); Brenda Rios, NOlVJoins in Bias Battle, Da-raorr FREE PRESS, Mar. 5,

1999, at El (discussing the National Organization for Women's contention that Detroit
Edison fostered a sexually and racially hostile work environment); Jonathon Saltzman,
ACLUHits New Poliiy on Sex Harassment PROVIDFxCEJ.-BuL,,, Oct. 21, 1997, at CI (discuss-

ing the American Civil Liberties Union's opposition to a broad sexual harassment policy
prohibiting all city employees from having any sexually suggestive literature at work).
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FIGURE 1
OCCUPATIONS

Cases
Mgt/White Collar
---(21%)

Professional

(12%)

Clerical
(29%)

Workforce
Blue Collar
(29%)

Mgt/White Collar
(41%)
-

Professional

(7%)

Clerical
(23%)

only ten cases. 61 Further, in contrast to well-publicized accounts of
class action lawsuits in the media, 62 only three of the approximately
61
The EEOC records its participation in lawsuits by statute. Therefore, numbers are
available for the EEOC's participation for all actions brought pursuant to Title VII, a
broader category than sexual harassment suits. In the fiscal year 1992, the EEOC was involved in 242 suits. The EEOC was involved in 260 suits in 1993, 235 in 1994, 193 in 1995,
and 106 in 1996. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, LITIGATION STATIS'xCS,
FY 1992 THROUGH 'Y 1998, available at http://wwiv.eeoc.gov/stats/litigation.html (last
modified Mar. 1, 2000).
62
See, e.g., EEOC: Women Sexually Harassedat FordPlants, BosTON GLoBL, Jan. 8, 1999,
at C4 (discussing a lawsuit against Ford and explaining that the "women were called sexually degrading names, groped, and subjected to explicit graffiti"); David Greising & Stephen Franklin, ComplaintsPersistat Mitsubishi Plant,Pane4CHI. Tiu.,Jan. 23, 1999, § 2, at 1
(referring to a $34 million class action settlement won by workers at Mitsubishi plant and
noting that, in spite of the plaintiffs' victory, harassment problems still exist); Bob Kievr,
HearingScheduled on Astra SettlemenA WORCESTR TLEGRAM & GAzETTE, Jan. 20, 1999, at El
(discussing $9.8 million settlement of a class action sexual harassment case against Astra
USA); Deborah Peterson & John M. McGuire, Hooters vs. Harassment Charges, ST. Louis
PosT-DISPATCH,July 30, 1993, at IF (discussing a class action suit brought by seven former
Hooters waitresses who alleged a sexually hostile work environment); Stroh Settles Women's
Suit CitingAds, Nrv ORLE.ANs TMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 2, 1993, at C8 (discussing a sexud har-

2001]

THE SWEEP OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES

563

five hundred cases involved a class action. 63 In fact, our data show
that approximately 90% of cases are brought by an individual female
plaintiff who is not represented by the EEOC or a public interest
group.
C.

The Workplace

Where does the harassment occur? Given the very name of the
claim (a hostile "work" environment), it is noteworthy that 114 cases,
or 23% of our total, include allegations of harassment that did not
occur on the employer's premises. Indeed, in sixty-nine cases (14% of
the total), all of the alleged harassment took place outside of the
workplace. Considering the one hundred cases that include a
nonvorksite complaint, about half contain an employment related
event, such as a company party. Thirty cases involve a nonwork social
event, such as private drinks after work.64 However, in thirty-five
cases, the harassment included nonconsensual, off-premises conduct,
such as phone calls, letters, or visits to the victim's home.
One study found that "[v]ictims are more likely than non-victims
to work exclusively or mostly with individuals of the opposite sex."6 5
Our study finds no support for this statement. The courts mentioned
the sex segregation of the workplace in less than half of the cases
(47%). Of those cases, approximately one-third of the workplaces
were mostly male and approximately two-thirds were mixed male and
female workplaces. Only four district court decisions described the
workplace as mostly female.
D.

The Defendants

The majority of cases involved employers in the private sector.6
Only 4% of the cases involved the federal government as defendant,
assment suit filed by eight women against Stroh Brewing Company alleging that the Brewery's ads, and in particular those featuring the "Swedish Bikini Team," fostered a sexually
hostile environment);Jon Tevlin, The Evdekl Mines Cases: Mal PriePain?,Mi.,%,rorous-ST.
PAUL STAR Tam., Nov. 29, 1998, at 1A (discussing "the first [case] in the nation to be
certified as a class-action 'hostile work environment' sexual harassment suit").
63 Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847 (D. Minn. 1993);Jcnson v Eveleth
Taconite Co., 139 F.R.D. 657 (D. Minn. 1991); Sims v. Montgomery County Comm'n, 766
F. Supp. 1052 (M.D. Ala. 1990).
64 For an interesting discussion of the regulation of such "associational" rights, see
Terry Morehead Dworkin, It's My Life-Leave Me Alone: Offdhe.Job Emplyce AssedationalPdivacy Rights, 35 Am. Bus. UJ. 47 (1997).
65
U.S. MN.rr S-s. PRoT. BD., supra note 5, at 17. We note that much of the workplace
remains sex-segregated. See Randy P. Albelda, OccupationalSgrgation b.- Race and Gender,
1958-1981, 39 INDus. & L.z. R.. REv. 404, 405-06 (1986) (finding that the "occupational
distributions of all men and women have changed very little when race is held constant").
66 This study does not examine questions concerning the appropriate definition of

"employer" under Title VII. Rather, we limited our description of "employer to include
only private, federal government, or state or local government employers. For a discussion
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and 23% involved a state or local government. If anything, state and
local governments are overrepresented in the cases. Federal employees comprise only 2% of the workforce, while state and local employees comprise 13.6%.67
At least one commentator has suggested that coworkers are most
often the perpetrators of sexual harassment. 68 In the judicial opinions, however, most harassers are supervisors. 69 Plaintiffs named supervisors or superiors alone as the harassers in 59% of the cases, and
both supervisors and coworkers were named in 20% of the cases.
When the plaintiff named only one harasser, the vast majority (85%)
were supervisors. The selection effect may explain these numbers.
That is, plaintiffs are aware of the lower probability of success when
coworkers are the harassers, and therefore victims of harassment file
suit less frequently when coworkers rather than supervisors are involved. Thus, in the reported and filed cases, most harassers are su-

pervisors. In almost 8% of the cases, we could not determine the
number of harassers involved although 72% of the cases involved harassment by one person only. Another 18% involved two to five harassers and one case involved fourteen different harassers.
E. The Claims
Two different sexual harassment claims exist: quid pro quo and
hostile work environment. The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed
the distinction between these claims, explaining that "[t]o the extent
they illustrate the distinction between cases involving a threat which is
carried out and offensive conduct in general, the terms are relevant."70 The labels do not, however, control the analysis of employer
71
liability once a finding of discrimination has been made.
Quid pro quo harassment involves a grant or denial of economic
benefits following the employee's response to "[u]nwelcome sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, [or] other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature."72 The quintessential example of a quid pro
quo claim is a supervisor's demand of 'sleep with me or I'll fire you.'
To establish a quid pro quo claim, the plaintiff must show that "tangiof current issues surrounding the definition of "employer," see Donald F. Kiesling,Jr., Title
VII and the Temporay Employment Relationship, 32 V.A. U. L. REv. 1, 5-9 (1997).
67
BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, REPORT ON THE AMERICAN WoitRmoi=ca 149 tbl.13
(1999) (reporting 1998 data), available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/rtaw/stattab2.htm.
68 Note, Unemployment Compensation Benefits for the Victim of Worh.Related Sexual Harass.
ment 3 HAuv. WOMEN'S LJ. 173, 177 (1980) (noting that most harassers are coworkers of
the plaintiff).

69 See supranotes 9, 41-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of "published" opinions. In our study, 461 cases described the type of harasser.
70

Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753 (1998).

71
72

Id. at 752; accordFaragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2000).
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blejob benefits are conditioned on an employee's submission to conduct of a sexual nature and that adverse job consequences result from
the employee's refusal to submit to the conduct." 7 3 Tangiblejob benefits may include transfers, promotions, favorable evaluations, pay
raises, or continued employment. 74
A hostile working environment claim arises in situations in which
an employee must endure verbal or physical abuse as part of her employment. In such a claim, an employee may or may not suffer a loss
ofjob benefits. Conduct that degrades or devalues women or conduct
that would not occur but for the sex of the employee can create a
hostile environment arising out of sex discrimination.", If a supervisor continually pinches or grabs an employee but never hinges a promotion or raise on reciprocity, a quid pro quo claim would not
succeed.7 6 The employee would, however, have a hostile environment
77
claim .
The bulk of sex harassment cases involve hostile environment
claims. Almost 70% of the cases only include a hostile environment
claim, while another 22.5% combine a hostile environment claim with
a quid pro quo claim.
Professor Marion Grain has suggested that women in traditionally
female jobs are relatively likely to bring quid pro quo claims, while
women entering male-dominated workplaces are more likely to complain of hostile environment.78 The fact that courts described the
workplace as predominantly female in only four cases complicated
our verification of this part of Professor Crain's theory. However, we
can compare the rate of quid pro cases in male-dominated workplaces
and mixed workplaces. In the eighty-eight mostly-male-workplace
cases, only 17% include a quid pro quo claim and 83% rely solely on
Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1414 (10th Cir. 1987).
See, e-g., Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1048.49 (3d Cir.
1977) (concluding that Title VII is violated when a supervisor makes sexual ad-ances or
demands toward a subordinate employee and conditions aspects of the employee's career
development on a favorable response to those advances or demands).
75 See Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that repeated verbal comments of a sexual and nonsexual nature were properly considered by the
district court); Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1416-17 (holding that nonsexual verbal harassment of a
black female security guard should be considered in a sexual harassment claim); McKinney
v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("We have never held that sexual harassment
... of an employee or group of employees that occurs because of the sex of the employee
must, to be illegal under Title VII, take the form of sexual advances or of other incidents
with dearly sexual overtones."); Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269, 127881 (D.D.C.
1988) (granting recovery for a hostile environment created by supervisors bestowing preferential treatment on women who submitted to their sexual advances).
76 See Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1413-14.
77 See id. at 1417.
78 Marion Crain, I1omen, Labor Unions, and Hostile IoM Envirownent Sial Haras.ent:
The Untold Story, 4 TEx. J. Wozc.N & L 9, 16-17 (1995).
73
74
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hostile environment claims. In the 145 mixed-workplace cases, by
contrast, 34% include quid pro quo claims and only 66% rely solely
on hostile environment claims. Thus, it appears that mostly-male
workplaces tend to generate hostile environment claims, consistent
with Professor Crain's analysis.
Conforming to stereotypes, physical harassment was significantly
more likely in the blue-collar and pink-collar cases than in higher-status occupation cases. Nearly half of the blue-collar and clerical cases
(48% and 50%, respectively) contained a complaint of physical harassment, compared to only 32% of the management and 38% of the professional cases. In addition, most sex harassment cases, whether quid
pro quo or hostile environment, include other claims as well. In fact,
only 13% of the cases did not include at least one other claim. Almost
20% brought at least four other claims. Six plaintiffs brought nine
other claims.
Of prime interest is the type of conduct at issue in the cases. We
looked for the presence of sixteen categories of sexual harassment
conduct (plus a catch-all "other" category). These categories include
the following: oral and written comments about women in general or
, particular victims; written comments or graffiti; pornography; posters
or pinups; objectionable letters or materials sent to the plaintiff; physical contact of a sexual nature or a nonsexual nature (such as hitting);
requests for dates; and requests for sexual favors. Table 1 shows the
frequency of these types of conduct. For example, the plaintiff alleged that the harassers made sexual comments about her physical
appearance in 48% of the cases and alleged physical sexual contact in
42% of the cases.
By referring to Table 1, we can make the following observations.
The type of harassing conduct differs somewhat by occupational category but not in clearly predictable ways. Physical harassment is most
common in white-collar cases, although, due to coding issues, we have
only nineteen white-collar cases involving physical harassment. Requests for dates formed part of harassment complaints somewhat
more often in clerical or management settings than in blue-collar settings. The larger conclusion is that the type of conduct does not differ
dramatically by occupation.
The type of conduct also differs in the segregated workplaces, but
again the differences are modest.
Complaints about requests for dates and requests for sexual favors were somewhat less frequent in mostly male workplaces than in
mixed workplaces. By contrast, segregation of the workplace did not
affect the proportion of physical harassment complaints.
Some of the more notorious cases involve poster pinups, general
graffiti, or other harassment against women in general, without any
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TABLE 1

SEXuAL HARASSlmNT IN DsmncT COURT CASES
Number

% of district
court cases

Plaintiff Specific Conduct
Oral comments about Plaintiff
Belittling names (e.g., babe, honey)
Physical appearance, sexual comments
Objectionable letters sent to plaintiff
Sexual materials left in plaintiffs private space
Less favorable treatment in work assignments,
conditions
Favorable treatment to employees in sexual
relations with supervisors/employers
Requests for dates
Requests for sexual favors

426

84.7

52.8*

98
244
25
25

19.5
48.6
5.0
5.0

59.2*
57A 0 *
52.0
68.0*

145

28.9

55.9

17
100
149

3A
19.9
29.7

88.2*0n
53.0
59.1"'

Physical harassment
Sexual nature (e.g., squeezing, pinching,
grabbing)
Nonsexual nature (e.g., hitting)

224

44.6

59.4"'

210
43

41.8
8.6

59.5*"'
62.8

60
89
42
27
34
35

12.0
17.7
8A
5.4
6.8
7.0

58.3
61.8*'
64.3*
51.9
70.6"
60.0

Conduct Aimed at Women in General
Oral comments about Women in general
Belittling names
Physical appearance, sexual comments
Pornographic descriptions
Offensive gestures
Written comments, like graffiti
Posters/pinups in public areas

MWin Rate

*(**) (***) Significant at the 10% (5%) (1%) level

conduct specifically directed against particular employees. These
cases turn out to be quite unusual. Nearly 85% of the cases in our
sample involve allegations of plaintiff-specific conduct. In fact, allegations of posters or pinups occurred in only 7% of the cases. Comments about women in general but not specifically about the plaintiff
were almost never alleged in isolation of other conduct. In fact, we
found only three cases in which the plaintiff premised her entire complaint on sexual comments about women in general.7 9 They all lost.
Paula Jones's sexual harassment suit against President Clinton 80
raised the issue of whether a single incident could constitute sex harassment. 8 ' Our data show that single-incident cases are highly unusual. Only 4% of our 502 cases involved a single incident of
harassment. (Tones itself occurred after our time period and is not in
79 Thompson v. Campbell, 845 F. Supp. 665 (D. Minn. 1994); Fair v. Guiding Eyes for
the Blind. Inc, 742 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Krijn v. Pogue Simone Real Estate Co.,
No. 89-Civ.-0829, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9108 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1989), re'd, 896 F.2d 687
(2d Cir. 1990).
80 Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark. 1998).
81 I. at 675 (failing to find alleged incident constitutes abusive working environment
when viewed under totality of the circumstances).
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L] Physical
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the database). The plaintiffs were successful in only seven of these
twenty cases, a significantly lower win rate than in cases complaining
of longer periods of harassment.
F. The Posture of the Case
The district court opinions we examined included many pretrial
opinions, such as summary judgment motions and motions to dismiss.
Twenty-five percent involved memorandum decisions after trial and
the remainder dealt with pretrial motions. Most trials were before a
judge rather than ajury. Recent years have seen a significantly higher
fraction of cases occurring at the dismissal or summary judgment
stage. In the 1986-1989 period, only half of the opinions are in pretrial
cases, while three-quarters of the opinions in the 1990s are at the pretrial stage. These results are consistent with the supposition that
judges are increasingly playing a gatekeeper role in sexual harassment
cases by deciding issues on legal rather than factual grounds. 82 While
this comports with Justice Holmes's vision that law will become more
rule-oriented as experience in an area increases, 83 it is inconsistent
82 See, e.g., M. Isabel Medina, A Matter of Fact: Hostile Environments and SummaryJudgments, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 311 (1999) (arguing that courts' tendencies to
decide hostile environment sexual harassment cases prevents juries from participating in
the enforcement of gender antidiscrimination norms).
83 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAv 1-2 (1881).
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FIGuRE 3
CoNDucr BY WORKPLACE SEGREGATION
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with the general trend in modem tort law that allows triers of fact to
decide most legal disputes. Despite the provisions in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 allowing for jury trials, ajury was involved in only twentynine cases. Of those cases, the jury reviewed the sexual harassment
allegations in only half.

THE SuccEassFUL PL~rru~s IN Disrucr COURT
Determining whether a plaintiff has won or lost is not always
easy,8 particularly in pretrial cases. We count the case as a "win" for
the plaintiff if the court upheld the plaintiff's sexual harassment claim
in whole or in part. Many opinions arise from pretrial motions to
dismiss the plaintiff's claim, after which a "winning" plaintiff could
face other motions to dismiss as well as a trial on the merits, post-trial

motions, and an appeal. Winning at an early stage does not necessarily indicate an ultimate victory for the plaintiff, but losing an early
motion typically indicates an ultimate defeat.
In some of our analyses of factors influencing wins, we limit ourselves to opinions attached to trials. Table 2a summarizes the proce84

For an extended discussion of the problems in determining whether a ci il rights

plaintiff is successful, see Theodore Eisenberg & Ste-art Schiab, 77e R aily of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 ComRNi. L Rxv. 641 (1987) (reporting empirical data on relative
success, burden, and financial drain on constitutional tort plaintiffs).
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dural posture of the district court cases and shows the success rate at
each stage. Table 2b shows that trials occurred in only a third of the
cases. As would be expected, given the standards for pretrial motions,
plaintiffs had a much higher success rate surviving pretrial motions
than obtaining a favorable final judgment. When a claim did reach
the trial stage, plaintiffs did significantly better before a jury than a
judge.
TABLE 2A
PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF SEX HARASSMENT CASES IN
DIsTRICT COURT CAsES

Pretrial motion on substance of claim
Pretrial motion on procedure, evidence
Memorandum order after bench trial
Motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict
Posttrial motions

Number

% of cases

Win Rate

326
19
124
4

64.9
3.8
24.7
0.8

52.5
79.0
39.5
75.0

29

5.8

65.5

TABLE 2B
TYPE OF TRILus IN DisTRicr COURT CASES
No trial; decided on pretrial motions

346

Bench trial
Jury trial
Both bench and jury trial

68.9

54.1

127
11
18

25.3
2.2
3.6

45.7
54.6
33.3

Appendix A shows the win rates for every category of case. Not
controlling for other factors and not separating motion opinions from
trial opinions, the successful plaintiff is a woman who alleged conduct
directed specifically at her by both supervisors and coworkers and
complained within the organization in some manner about the conduct. As expected, female plaintiffs fared better than male plaintiffs;
however, when both a male and female plaintiff sued, the success rate

was a surprising 89%. Blue-collar and clerical workers were more successful than management, white-collar, or professional employees.
Contrary to some suggestions, plaintiffs in sex-segregated workplaces
fared better than those in integrated workplaces.8 5
Understandably, plaintiffs were most successful where both supervisors and coworkers were the alleged harassers. Moreover, the success rates seem to increase as the number of the harassers increase.
However, the number of cases with multiple harassers is fairly small so
that this increase in the success rates is not statistically significant.
85 See Lee, supra note 4, at Al (suggesting that hostile environment claims will be
more difficult to win against defendants in industries historically perceived as tolerating a
higher degree of vulgarity and abuse).
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When a plaintiff alleged that the defendants commented about
her physical appearance or made comments of a sexual nature specifi-

cally to her, she won in 57% of the cases. Further, plaintiffs were
equally successful (59%) in cases wherein they complained of belittling or derogatory comments about them. Physical contact also
seems important: when plaintiffs did not allege physical contact of any
kind, they were successful in only 45% of the cases.
When the plaintiff had not complained within the organization
in some fashion, she lost almost 70% of the time.8 6 However, when
the employer had no formal sexual harassment programs or generalized grievance process which covered sexual harassment, the plaintiff
won 71% of the time. This comports with our finding that an absence
of employer liability is one of three main reasons that courts reject
plaintiffs' claims.
The preceding analysis is superficial in that it ignores the correlation between elements that influence success. For example, the type
of conduct and the type of workplace may jointly affect success. We
therefore turn to multivariate analysis to determine more precisely the
factors affecting wins.
Table 3 reports the results of two logistic regressions explaining
wins. The first regression includes all 502 cases in the district court
database, while the second regression limits itself to 130 usable cases
87
involving trials.
The factors strongly helping a plaintiff's case include the following: (1) the supervisor knew of the harassment before the victim complained externally; (2) the plaintiff alleged physical harassment; (3)

the case is covered by the Civil Rights Act of 1991; (4) the complaint
comes from a mostly male rather than a mixed workplace; (5) harassment involved supervisors rather than coworkers alone; (6) the plaintiff objected to the harassment; and (7) the employer had no general
or sex-harassment-specific grievance procedures in place.

86 One researcher has postulated that women are generally more likely to employ
passive coping strategies that reduce internal stress, such as talking ,ith others and venting
emotions, rather than confronting the harasser or filing a formal report. &e Margaret S.
Stockdale, TheDirect and ModeratingInfluencesof Sexual-HarassmentPerasiteness,GopingStrat-

egies, and Genderon Work-Rdated Outcome 22 PSycHOL WoMtEN Q. 521, 523 (1998) (noting

that women tend to reserve more confrontational approaches, such as reporting the harassment or telling the harasser to stop, for more severe incidents).
87 The odds ratio demonstrates how a particular variable affects the odds. Odds ratios
greater than one increase the odds, meaning that after controlling for the other variables

in the regression, such variables increase the chances of the plaintiff vinning the case;
conversely, odds ratios less than one indicate that the

chances.

-ariable harms the plaintiffs
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TABLE a
LOGISTIC REGRESSION SHOWING FACTORS INFLUENCING WINS IN
SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES
All District Court Cases
Odds Ratio

P>Izl

Trials Only.,
Odds Ratio
P>Iz

Independent Variables

3.053

1991 Civil Rights Act applies
Segregation of Workplace
Omitted reference variable=mostly
male
Workplace mostly female
Workplace mixed
Workplace can't tell segregation
Sex of Plaintiff
Omitted reference variable=male
Plaintiff female
Plaintiff both
Status of Harassers
Omitted reference
variable=supervisors only
Supervisors & coworkers
Coworkers only
Can't Tell status of harassers
Employer's Antiharassment procedure
Omitted reference variable=no
procedure
Employer has antiharassment
procedure
Can't tell if procedure exists
Plaintiff told coworkers of harassment
Plaintiff-specific harassment
Physical harassment
Type of Consent
Omitted reference variable=pl
expressed disapproval
Plaintiff gave no signals
Plaintiff sometimes reacted in kind
Can't tell
Knowledge of Supervisors
Omitted reference variable=no
supervisor knowledge
Supervisor Knew of Harassment
Can't tell whether supervisor knew
Single incident of harassment
Number
of observations
2
Chi
j2
Probability > chi
Pseudo R7

3.210

0.005***

0.789
0.576
1.334

0.884
0.086*
0.851

0.471
0.671

0.199
0.517

1.080
5.605

0.856
0.141

1.325
5.648

0.838
0.398

1.235
0.455
2.068

0.433
0.012**
0.070*

1.765
0.268
30.789

0.288
0.142
0.006***

0.402
0.595
2.038
1.532
1.632

0.055*
0.251
0.049**
0.182
0.025**

0.128
0.107
4.385
1.234
1.491

0.033**
0.018**
0.023**
0.780
0.426

0.207
0.782
0.995

0.063*
0.555
0.985

1.110
1.576

0.872
0.481

1.230
0.782

0.751
0.777

4.093
2.823
0.536
502
82.91
0.000
0.119

0.002***
0.022**

0.221
130
36.72
0.002
0.209

IV
APPELLATE COURTS RESULTS

A.

Case Characteristics

Most appellants were plaintiffs below. The plaintiff appealed in
74% of the cases, the employer in 18%, and both parties in the re-
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maining 8%. Given that plaintiffs and defendants win about equally
in the district courts, it follows8s that unsuccessful plaintiffs are more
likely to appeal than unsuccessful defendants. Even taking into account the somewhat lower success rate for plaintiffs in decisions issued
after a trial (40%), plaintiffs are still appealing at a higher rate than
defendants.
As Appendix A shows, the appellate courts confront plaintiffs, defendants, and allegations similar to those before the district courts.
For example, the occupational categories break down along the same
lines as the district court: one-third blue collar, one-third clerical, and
the remainder management or professional. As discussed above, the
similarities of the cases in the trial courts and appellate courts cast
doubt on the belief that blue-collar workers may not have the resources to pursue a lawsuit, much less pursue one through the appeals
stage. The fraction of appellate cases involving harassment only by
coworkers, 15.8%, is strikingly similar to the proportion of coworkeronly cases in the district courts (13%). Slightly more appellate cases
than district cases include a claim of physical harassment (53.1% to
44.6%), but the difference is not statistically significant. In sum, the
appeal filter does not alter the mix of cases very much.
Indeed, the greatest difference between the appellate and district
courts is that the appellate court data are more detailed. As seen in
Appendix A, with a few exceptions the "Missing/Can't tell" percentage is higher for district court variables than appellate court variables.
In general, this is because appellate opinions tend to be longer and
richer, and are less likely to discuss procedural issues with little factual
background. Thus, our coders found more data in the appellate
cases.
In most cases, the differences between the appellate and district
court are minor, but the differences in missing data involving employer antiharassment programs is astounding. When coding whether
or not the employer had an antiharassment program, general grievance procedures, or specific sex-harassment procedures, we could not
tell in 70.3% of the district court cases. For the vast bulk of district
cases, the presence or absence of an employer program was not worthy ofjudicial reporting in the opinion. By contrast, in the appellate
cases, we were unable to answer the question in only 36% of the cases.
In other words, the appellate judge usually gave this information in
the opinion, while the districtjudge did not. Assuming that appellate
88 Our appellate-court and district-court databases are not linked; thus, we cannot
track the same case through the system. Therefore, we do not estimate what factors lead to
an appeal at the individual-case level. However, we can determine at the gross level which
district-court characteristics show up disproportionately on appeal. From this perspective,
it is evident that plaintiffs who lose in district court show up disproportionately on appeal.
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and district cases have the same mix of employers with and without
programs, it appears that when employers do not have such a program, district judges fail to mention whether the antiharassment program exists. In the appellate data, 28.7% of the employers are known
not to have a program, which is dramatically higher than the 7% of
employers known not to have a program in the district-court database.
On the other side, 35.4% of the employers in the appellate database
are known to have some type of program, which is not substantially
more than the 22.8% of the employers in the district court database
known to have a program.
B. The Success Rates
Both plaintiffs and defendants had difficulty convincing the appellate courts to reverse the lower courts. When the plaintiff appealed, she succeeded in only 27% of the cases, while the defendant
also won in 27% of cases. These numbers are similar to other studies
of federal courts of appeals.8 9
As Table 4 shows, the success rate of plaintiffs varies dramatically
by circuit. In the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, plaintiffs
won fewer than a third of the appellate cases (twenty-four of eightyone), while in the Second, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits collectively, plaintiffs won nearly three-quarters of their cases on appeal
(twenty-five of thirty-four). Similar but more muted differences obtain when the analysis is restricted to officially published opinions.
The Fourth and Sixth Circuits officially publish fewer than half the
opinions they issue, a far lower rate than the other circuits, and seem
to publish a disproportionate number of opinions where plaintiffs
win. Still, these circuits, especially the Fourth, have lower plaintiff success rates than other circuits.
The varying success rates at the appellate level do not easily translate into corresponding success rates among district courts in the circuits. Although the plaintiffs' below average success rate in the
district courts of the Fourth Circuit and the above average success rate
in the district courts of the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits correspond to
low and high success rates, respectively, at their appellate levels, there
is no correspondence between district and appellate success rates
within the Second, Sixth, or Seventh Circuits. The most startling statistic among the district courts may be the huge number of district
court opinions, particularly at the pretrial stage, within the Seventh
Circuit. It turns out that the Northern District of Illinois wrote 102
opinions in sexual harassment cases, over twice as many as the forty-six
89 See Eisenberg & Schwab, supranote 45, at 517 (reporting that plaintiffs successfully
appealed 35% of a control group of published, non-civil-rights cases whereas defendants
successfully challenged 33% of these cases).
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TABLE 4
SuccEss RATES OF SEX HARASSMENT PLATIFFs BY CmCurr
DISTRICT COURT

Cases w/Trials

All Cases
# of
Cases

Circuit

% PI
-ins

1st

50.0

20

2d

50.0

3d
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
l1th
D.C.
TOTAL

APPELLATE COURT

% PI
Wins

# of
Cases

Published
Opinions

All Cases
% PI
'Wins

# of
Cases

% P
WIns

#of
Cases

80.0

7
5

50.0
80.0

6
5

18
12
6
9
20

37.5
21.1
38.5
28.0
27.3

8
19
13
25
33

37.5
30.0
38.5
44.4
32.1

8
10
13
9
28

18
7
17
15
7
157
Pr =
0.143

72.7
63.6
33.3
85.7
0.0
39.0
chi2 =
24.78

11
11
24
7
1
164
Pr. =
0.010

72.7
70.0
31.6
83.3
0.0
45.2
chi2 =
17.41

7

42.9

62

57.1
38.1

21

43.4
38.5
47.4
58.3
53.5

53
39
19
24
116

16.7
33.3
33.3
55.6
60.0

50.0
64.5
50.0
62.1
53.3
51.1
chi2 =
8.36

30
31
64
29
15
502
Pr. =
0.681

50.0
85.7
47.1
53.3
28.6
45.2
chi2 =
15.94

11
10
19
6
1
126
Pr =
0.096

cases from the District of Kansas or the thirty-seven opinions in the
Southern District of New York, the districts with the next most

opinions.
V
TRENDs OVF.R TWE
A-

The Civil Rights Act of 1991

The database spans almost ten years of decisions, allowing us to
examine trends over time. The enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 falls in the middle of this ten-year span. 90 After much debate

and a presidential veto of an earlier bill, Congress amended Title VII
when it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991. These amendments did
not alter the substantive law of sexual harassment but for the first time

provided for the recovery of punitive and compensatory damages as
well as the right to a jury trial. 91 In Landgrafv. USI Film Products, the
90

Pub. L No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in scauered sections of 42

U.S.C.).
91 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994 &-Supp. IH 1997) (providing for compensatory and punitive damages in Tide VII and ADA cases involving intentional discrimination and making a
jury trial available when such damages are sought).
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Supreme Court held that these provisions did not apply to cases pend92
ing prior to the enactment of the Act.
Unfortunately, we must remain tentative about the effects of the
1991 Act. Even though we read cases through 1995, the 1991 Civil
Rights Act (CRA) covered only thirty-three cases in our sample. This
reflects the fact that it takes the federal courts a long time to process
cases. Because jury trials occurred in only three of those cases, we can
detect no stampede to juries from the Act.
One-third of the cases under the Act did request punitive damages, significantly more than the 11% of pre-CRA cases that requested
punitive damages. Three post-CRA plaintiffs received punitive damages, compared to only 1% of the pre-CRA cases. Thus, the Act's creation of punitive damages does seem to have an effect.

The CRA may increase the likelihood of monetary damages as
well. Ten post-CRA plaintiffs (30% of our sample) received monetary
damages, compared to only 11% prior to the CRA.
B.

Win Rates over Time

Table 5 shows the complex trend in win rates for sexual harassment cases.
TABLE 5
SEX H RAssMEN'r PLAnrFs' Disricr COURT WiN RAas OVER TIME
Year
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

# of Cases
15
36
20
41
62

% Won
40.0
38.9
40.0
43.9
51.6

1991
1992

81
66

1993
1994

57
95

59.3
54.6

1995
Total

29
502 cases

57.9
48.4
55.2
51.2

The win rate in 1994 is lower than the immediately preceding years,
consistent with the supposition that Harrissignaled a cutback in sexual
harassment claims. 93 But the win rate in 1995 is not lower. Overall,
win rates are not lower in the mid-1990s than they were a decade ear511 U.S. 244, 286 (1994).
Bradley Golden, Note, Harris v. Forklift: The Supreme Court Takes One Step Fonvard
and Two Steps Back on the Issue of HostileEnvironment Sexual Harassment, 1994 DET. C.L, Rv,
1151; Mary C. Gomez, Note, Sexual Harassment after Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.-Is it
Really Easierto Prove?, 18 NOVA L. REv. 1889 (1994).
92

93
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Her. Statistically, we cannot reject the hypothesis of no linear time
trend in win rates.
The lack of a time trend should not be surprising, however, because it is consistent with most selection-effect models of litigation.9 4
Suppose, for example, that courts became more receptive to sexual
harassment claims (perhaps reflecting legislative enactments). One
would expect that more plaintiffs would bring claims in response and
that these additional claims would tend to be weaker. The result
could be no change in overall win rates. While the courts might treat
a claim of a given strength more favorably than in earlier years, this
could be counteracted by the increased incentive to bring weaker
claims.
Vi
REcENT IssuEs iN SEXUAL HARASS..Nmr L.v

A.

The Conceptualization of Sexual Harassment

Sexual harassment in the workplace is actionable only if it meets
Title VII's prohibition on discrimination "because of" sex.9 5 Although
it is now beyond question that Title VII provides such a cause of action, scholars have begun to refocus on the question of why sexual
harassment falls within Title V]1. 9 6 That is, these scholars seek to determine why sexual harassment is sex discrimination in order to understand both how to remedy the wrong and what behavior should be
included within the category. 97 Below, we briefly discuss the recent

work of four scholars on the "why" of sexual harassment and conclude
that our findings substantiate their conclusions that the courts narrowly construe what constitutes sexual harassment.
Professor Anita Bernstein "examines sexual harassment with an
eye toward remediation, prevention, and other pragmatics."95 She describes the divisions in the judicial and academic communities over
sexual harassment as "miscommunication" and sexual harassment as
coercion as well as a division as to the role of fault in sexual harassment claims. 9 9 If harassment is a wrong inflicted by one person upon
94 See generallyGeorge L Priest & Benjamin Klein, The S&kdion ofDisfittesforLitigation,
13J. LEmc. STrU. 1 (1984) (presenting empirical data on the selection effect model and its
implications).
95 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), 2000e-2 (1994 & Supp. m 1997); see Oncale %.Sundmner
Offshore Sens., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (holding that Title VIi's prohibition of discrimination "because of sex" protects men as well as women).
96 See supranotes 30-32 and accompanying text.
97 See Franke, supra note 30, at 691-95.
98 Anita Bernstein, An OldJurisprudence:Respect in Rdrosped, 83 CoR.,ju. L RE%% 1231,
1232 (1998) [hereinafter Bernstein, An OldJuriprudence];see Anita Bernstein, Treating&xual Harassmentwith Resper, 111 Hv. L REv. 445 (1997) [hereinafter Bernstein, Treating).
99 See Bernstein, Treating,supra note 98, at 447-48.
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another then tort remedies should govern. 0 0 However, Title VII focuses on the "atmosphere or working conditions rather than fault."' 01
Bernstein reconciles these competing perspectives by describing sexual harassment as a type of incivility or disrespect. 0 2 She further argues that sexual harassment denies each individual the respect she is
due simply by her status as a person: "Respect in the sense of recognition [of a person's inherent worth] is owed to all persons, and thus
workplace sexual harassment betrays the ideal of recognition respect
...
."103 Thus, Bernstein recommends use of a "respectful person
standard" in hostile environment cases as "giving content to the ideal
of equality behind Title VII as well as the ideal of individual autonomy
behind dignitary-tort law.' u 0 4 In using a respectful person standard,
Bernstein seeks to do more than simply replace one word with another. She argues that "[buy moving the inquiry away from a complainant's reaction and turning it on the conduct of employers, the
switch from 'reasonable' to 'respectful' avoids the victim-blaming that
has marginalized and devalued women workers."' 0 5
Professor Katherine Franke begins by analyzing the flaws in the
current understanding of sexual harassment through the use of samesex harassment cases. She explains that "by looking to the margins of
a doctrine, much can be understood about tensions in the doctrine at
the center." 0 6 She describes the three historic "principal justifica-

tions" for the inclusion of sexual harassment within Title VII's prohibition against discrimination "because of' a person's sex.' 0 7 Franke
argues that these justifications fail to account for why sexual harassment is a form of sexual discrimination. Franke asserts that "sexual
harassment is a sexually discriminatory wrong because of the gender
norms it reflects and perpetuates." 0 8 She describes sexual harassment as a "technology of sexism"-a tool by which sexist goals are
accomplished. 0 9 Franke maintains that sexual harassment "perpetuates, enforces, and polices a set of gender norms that seek to feminize
100
101
102
103
104
105

106

See id. at 448.
Id.

Id at 450.
Id. at 452.
Id. at 450.
Bernstein, An Old Jurisprudence,supra note 98, at 1234.
Katherine M. Franke, Gender, Sex, Agency and Discrimination:A Reply to Professor

Abrams, 83 CoxRNLL L. Rnv. 1245, 1250 (1998). Interestingly, our study seeks to learn
about sexual harassment from the opposite point of view of Professor Franke-by examining the run of cases (rather than the margin).
107 Franke, supra note 30, at 698-729. The three rationales under which sexual harassment is considered sex discrimination are: (1) because it violates formal equality princlples, id. at 705-14; (2) because it is sexual, id. at 714-25; and (3) because it is sexually
subordinating, id at 725-29.
108
109

Id. at 693.

Id.
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women and masculinize men."" 0 By reconceiving sexual harassment
as an exercise of gendered power, Franke seeks to provide the legal
system with a principled method by which to judge all sexual harassment claims-both "different sex" and same-sex claims."'
In her most recent work, Professor Kathryn Abrams also seeks to
encompass same-sex harassment cases within a conceptualization of
sexual harassment." 2 For Abrams, however, women's subordination
and the dynamics of the workplace must remain at the center of sexual harassment analysis.1 13 In essence, she conceives of sexual harassment as the institutionalization of women's subordination through
the preservation of male control of the workplace and the reinforcement of masculine norms in the workplace." 4 Ultimately for Abrams,
the wrong of sexual harassment is the "interference with human
agency, and particularly the agency of women."" 5
Abrams suggests that there are many forms of sexual harassment:
There is harassment that secures the work place as a site of male
control versus harassment that secures it as a zone of either male
comfort or masculine normative entrenchment. There is harassment that is directed at women as a group, harassment that is directed at individual women as representatives of a group, and
harassment that is directed at men and women as individuals.1 1 6
Abrams argues that by focusing on the subordination of women, each
of the above forms of sexual harassment may be recognized as actionable. She asserts that "[t]his pluralism [of sexual harassment] is crucial
in propounding an accurate description of a phenomenon that occurs
7
at the intersection of a variety of oppressive dynamics.""
Professor Vicki Schultz also argues that courts and scholars
should increase recognition of nonsexualized behavior as sexual harassment." 8 She asserts that sexual harassment is a tool used (primarily) by men as a method of undermining women's competence in the
workplace and thereby blocking women from certain jobs." 9 She ar110

d. at 696.

By conceiving of sexual harassment as a means of feminizing women and masculinizing men, Franke's account reaches beyond the workplace to encompass all other fora.
111

See Franke, supra note 106, at 1248-49 (noting school-based sexual harassment as an

example).
112 Abrams, supra note 30.
113 I&at 1172. In this article, Abrams discusses Bernstein's and Franke's theories and
concludes that Bernstein and Franke have shifted away from a subordination account of

sexual harassment. I.
114
115
116

I&
I.

117

Id. at 1217.

118

See Schultz, supranote 30, at 1689.
See U at 1686.87.

119

Id. at 1215.
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gues that courts have placed too much emphasis on the "sexual" aspect of sexual harassment claims. 120 That is, according to Professor
Schultz, courts currently employ a "sexual desire-dominance paradigm" when judging sexual harassment claims. 12 1 If the defendant's
conduct is sexual in nature, the courts more readily find a hostile environment. 12 2 However, courts often ignore nonsexual conduct such as
inadequate training, name calling, physical contact and abuse, and
less favorable work assignments. 123 Professor Schultz notes that by ignoring this type of behavior, courts may be overlooking treatment that
is clearly geared toward discriminating against women because of
sex. 124 Schultz accepts and incorporates Franke's theory of gender
conformity and includes non-gender-conforming men among those
whose competence is questioned. 25 Therefore, Schultz argues for a
competence-centered paradigm in which courts focus on whether the
defendant used sexual and/or nonsexual conduct to undermine the
plaintiffs competence, creating a hostile environment because of the
26
plaintiffs gender.
Franke and Abrams address the harms of sexual harassment on a
macro level. Although each victim feels the harm as an individual, the
harm arises as a result of that individual's status within a group. In
this way, the subordination of women through the enforcement of
male norms or the exercise of power to enforce those norms is a harm
that affects entire groups. In contrast, Schultz and Bernstein view the
harm of sexual harassment on a micro level-sexual harassment depriving the individual of respect or sexual harassment as undermining
an individual's competence. In other words, the harm is experienced
by the individual herself.
Regardless of the perspective from which each scholar views the
harm, each faults the courts for operating under too narrow a view of
sexual harassment. As a positive or descriptive matter, they claim that
courts tend to ignore behavior that "merely" subordinates, disrespects,
enforces gender norms, or attacks the competence of women (and
men). Our findings support this claim. Plaintiffs alleging "harassment
as sexualized behavior" 12 7 have significantly higher win rates than
other sexual harassment plaintiffs. Plaintiffs who alleged harassment
based on comments of a sexual or physical nature were more successful than plaintiffs who alleged comments that devalued women as wo120
121

See ad. at 1689.

122

See id.

123
124
125
126
127

See id. at 1689-90.
See id. at 1690-91.
See id. at 1691-92.
See id. at 1692.
See supra Part III.

Id
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men (such as "honey" or "babe").128 Further, harassment claims
premised upon physical contact of a sexual nature met greater success
than physical conduct of a nonsexual nature.1 9
These "less successful" claims are encompassed within the theories described above. For Bernstein, physical conduct (such as hitting) or belittling, devaluing language surely meets a test of denying
an employee the respect she is due. For Schultz, this behavior is calculated to undermine the competence of women in the workplace. For
Franke, the belittling names aimed at women reminds women of the
feminine roles they are required to play, while those aimed at men
criticizes them for not attaining masculine goals. In addition, the
physical conduct, even if not of a sexual nature, does the same. In
cross-sex cases, by hitting women, men reinforce the gendered norms
of the male aggressor and the passive female victim. In same-sex
cases, nonsexual physical conduct (such as the "rough housing present in Oncale"13 0 ) serves to keep men in the physical aggressor mode
while punishing those men who do not play along. Finally, for
Abrams, language devaluing women reminds women of the primacy

of male norms in the workplace while the physical conduct secures
the workplace as a site of male control.
Our findings also support the arguments of Schultz and Abrams
that courts are not including nonphysical, nonsexual harassment
within the scope of sexual harassment. In cases in which plaintiffs
alleged less favorable work assignments, for example, plaintiffi were
significantly less successful than plaintiffs alleging requests for sexual
favors.
Finally, in considering the difference in win rates between allegations involving comments about women in general versus comments
directed at the plaintiff specifically, we see that courts give greater attention to plaintiff-specific conduct.1 3 1 When plaintiffs alleged harassment based upon comments of a physical nature made about women
in general, the success rate was a mere 11%. However, when the comments concerned the particular plaintiff and were of a physical nature, the in rate rises to 28%. Although Schultz and Bernstein would
most likely find comments directed at women as a group to constitute
sexual harassment, Franke and Abrams's "macro" perspectives are
more on point. Under Franke's theory, comments about women in
general, not about the particular plaintiff, reinforce the feminization
128
See supranotes 85-86 and accompanying text (reporting a 60% success rate for suits
based on allegations of comments of sexual or physical nature).
129 See supra Part III.
130 For example, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Semices, Ina, 523 U.S. 75 (1998), involved
"roughhousing." Id. at 82.
131 See supra Part HI.
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of women (and in the alleged harasser, reinforce the role of men as
sexual aggressor). For Abrams, these comments contribute directly to
subordination of women by reducing women to sexualized beings
rather than employees of equal status.
In sum, our findings support the claim that courts do not recognize all discriminatory behavior that reinforces gender roles and sexualizes women in the workplace. The sweep of court opinions reveals
that courts take most seriously claims of sexual harassment that are
plaintiff-specific and sexually based.
B.

The Reasonable Woman Standard

In order to state an actionable claim, the aggrieved party must
allege harassment sufficiently "severe or pervasive" to be considered
both subjectively and objectively hostile or abusive. 3 2 Any such test
immediately begs the question of whose perspective courts should use
to evaluate the allegations most accurately and objectively. Until

1991, the courts used the reasonable person test.
In 1991, the Ninth Circuit articulated a "reasonable woman" standard to analyze the plaintiff's claim. In Ellison v. Brady,' 33 the court
declared, "We... prefer to analyze harassment from the victim's perspective."' 34 Under this methodology, the plaintiff can prove a prima
facie case of hostile environment by showing "conduct which a reasonable woman would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of employment and create an abusive working
35
environment."1
Two years after Ellison, the Supreme Court in Harrisv. Forklift Systems, Inc. held that in order for sexual harassment to be actionable it
must be perceived objectively by a "reasonable person" to be hostile or
abusive.' 3 6 Despite the Court's use of the "reasonable person" standard, it did not explicitly reject the "reasonable woman" test.137 Following Harris, the lower courts split on the question of the
appropriate objective standard.' 3 8 The Ninth Circuit responded by
132
133
134

135
136
137

Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
Id.at 878.
Id. at 879.

Harris,510 U.S. at 21.
See Mary Anne Weiss, Note, Ninth CircuitBroadens Reasonableness Standardfor Hostile
Work Environment Sexual Harassment:Fuller v. City of Oakland, 31 U.S.F. L. REv. 665, 676

(1997) ("The Court mentioned the reasonable person, but it did not hold that such a
standard was required .... Thus, the Court avoided the opportunity to resolve the conflict
between the circuits on the appropriate reasonableness standard.").
138 CompareDeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 594 (5th Cir.
1995) ("The test is an objective one, not a standard of offense to a 'reasonable woman."'),
with West v. Phila. Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 753 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that the relevant
question is whether "the discrimination would have detrimentally affected a reasonable
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adopting the standard of a "reasonable person with the same fundamental characteristics."13 9
Since Ellison, the reasonable woman standard has received much
attention in the academic literature. Many commentators argue that
the use of a "reasonable man" standard is contrary to the intent of
Title VII and that courts should follow the lead of the Ninth Circuit
and adopt the reasonable woman (or reasonable person with the same
fundamental characteristics or reasonable victim) standard. 140 Others
have suggested that such a standard is contrary to the principle of

equality or that it is unfair to hold men to an unclear standard of
behavior.

141

person of the same protected class in that position") and Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28
F.3d 1446, 1456 (7th Cir. 1994) (employing a "reasonable woman" standard).
139 Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit's
standard was intended to represent a compromise between the Flison reasonable woman
standard and the Supreme Court's reasonable person standard. See Crowe v. Wiltel Communications Sys., 103 F.3d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 1996).
140
See Sarah A. DeCosse, Simply Unbdievable- Reasonable Women and Hostile Environment
Sexual Harassmen 10 LAw & INEQ. 285, 286, 309 (1992) (arguing that the reasonable
woman standard challenges stereotyped roles and permits a broader scope of actionable
claims); Gillian K Hadfield, Rational Women: A Test for Sex-Based Harassment,83 CAt. L RL%.
1151, 1157 (1995) (advocating the use of a "rational woman" standard); Kim L Kir, The
"Reasonable Woman" Standard in Sexual Harassment Case, 81 I" BJ. 404, 408 (1993) (encouraging Illinois courts to adopt the reasonable woman test); RobertJ. Shoop, The Reasoable Woman in a Hostile Work Environment 72 EDuc. L REP. 703, 703 (1992) (arguing that
the reasonable woman standard makes the legal system more responsive to women). Commentators have also examined the reasonable woman standard and the Ellhon decision. See
Angela Baker, Comment, The "ReasonableWoman"Standard Under Ellison v. Brady: Implicalions for Assessing the Severity of Sexual Harassmentand the Adequacy ofEmp!oar Respons, 17 J.
CoRP. L 691, 692 (1992) (noting that the Ellison reasonable voman standard allows courts
to examine the difference in social power between women and men); Deborah S. Brenneman, Comment, From a Woman's Point of View.: The Use of the Reasonable Woman Standard in
Sexual Harassment Cases, 60 U. CtN. L REv. 1281, 1305 (1992) (advocating the reasonable
woman standard as a means of neutralizing the divergent perceptions of men and women
regarding appropriate behavior); Jolynn Childers, Note, Is There a Placefor a Reasonable
Woman in the Law? A Discussion of Rerent Developments in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 42 Due LJ. 854, 857 (1993) (advocating a reasonable victim standard); Cheryl L
Dragel, Note & Comment, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment:Should the Ninth Circuit's
'ReasonableWoman" StandardBeAdopted?, 11J.L & Com. 237, 238 (1992) (noting that "'the
reasonable woman standard' appears to ease the burden on female plaintiffs seeking to
establish hostile environment sexual harassment");JeffreyA. Gette, Comment, SexualHarassment and the Reasonable Woman Standard.Is It a Viable Solution?,31 Dt:Q. L REv. 841, 857
(1993) (arguing for the adoption of the reasonable woman test); Deborah B. Goldberg,
Note, The Road to Equality: The Application of the Reasonable Woman Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases,2 CARnozo WoiEN's LJ. 195, 212 (1995) (advocating adoption of the reasonable woman standard and arguing that the reasonable person standard hurts women).
141 See Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. Peirce, The Lega4 Ethical, and SodalImplications of the
"ReasonableWoman" Standard in Seutal Harasment Case; 61 FoRDH,t. L REv. 773, 825-27
(1993) (arguing that it is unfair to hold men to a standard that they may be unable to fully
appreciate or understand because they are men); Paul B.Johnson, 77e ReasonableWoman in
Sexual Harassment Law: Progress or Illusion?, 28 WARE FoREsr L. REv. 619, 621 (1993)
("[C] ourts that have embraced the new standard have done so primarily as a declaration of
political faith, not because the standard was of any real iulue."); Kathleen A. Kenealy, Sex-
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In light of such vigorous debate, we read each case to see whether
the courts discussed the reasonableness standard and, if so, whether
the standard was that of the reasonable person, reasonable woman, or
reasonable victim. Interestingly, we found more articles discussing
the reasonable woman standard than courts adopting the standard.
Of all the cases we studied, only twenty-five opinions adopted the reasonable woman standard.
TABLE 6
REASONABLENESS STANDARDS AND WIN RATES OF SEX HARASSMENT
PLAINTIFFS IN DisTRIcT COURT
Reasonableness Standard Used
Reasonable Person
Reasonable Woman

Reasonable Victim
Reasonable Victim with Plaintiff's demographic features

None

First number in box: number of cases
Second number in box: row percentage
Third number in box: column percentage

Plaintiff
Loses

Plaintiff
Wins

Total

45
56%
18%
12

36
44%
14%
13

81
100%
16%
25

48%

52%

100%

5%

5%

5%

2
50%
1%
1
100%
0%
185
47%
76%
245
49%
100%

2
50%
1%
0
0%
0%
206
53%
80%
257
51%
100%

4
100%
1%
1
100%
0%
391
100%
78%
502
100%
100%

Pearson ch 2 = 2.8827
Prob - 0.578

Fewer than one quarter of the district court cases mentioned any "reasonable standard" at all, and of those cases, approximately threequarters employed the reasonable person standard. The plaintiff's
success rate was slightly higher in cases in which the courts adopted
ual Harassmentand the Reasonable Woman Standard,8 Lm. Lw. 203, 203, 210 (1992) (proposing that the reasonable woman standard is a legal setback for women because it sends
the message that women are inherently unreasonable); Walter Christopher Arbery, Note, A
Step Backwardfor EqualityPrinciples:The "ReasonableWoman" Standard in Title VII Hostile Wod
Environment Sexual Harassment Claims, 27 GA. L. REv. 503, 552-53 (1993) (rejecting the reasonable woman standard because it does not reflect the idea of shared values between men
and women); Saba Ashraf, Note, The Reasonablenessof the "Reasonable Woman" Standard: An
Evaluation of Its Use in Hostile Environment Claims Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 21
HorsrA L. REy. 483, 484 (1992) (arguing that the reasonable woman standard subverts
Title VII because it is "difficult for employers to announce and enforce policies concerning
sexual harassment that conform to a subjective, rather than an objective standard").
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the reasonable woman standard than those in which the courts used
the reasonable person standard. 142 Given how few cases mentioned

the reasonable standard at all, the specific "reasonable" standard used
is not statistically significant in predicting win rates.
Some commentators have suggested that courts are increasingly
adopting the reasonable woman standard in sexual harassment

cases. 143 We see no dramatic upward trend, with only a handful of
courts each year using the reasonable woman standard. Our data
show that courts used the standard in 5% of the cases in 1994 and 7%

in 1995, compared to 6% in 1991, 8% in 1992, and 11% in 1993.
Perhaps most interesting is the interplay between the "reasonable" standard used in those cases in which plaintiffs lost. When courts
determined that the conduct complained of was not severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile environment, they most often did not
mention any reasonableness standard. However, when they did, they
cited the reasonable person test over 75% of the time. Further, of the
twenty-seven cases in which courts rejected claims on the grounds that

the plaintiff should not reasonably be affected by the conduct, courts
discussed the reasonable person test in eighteen cases and the reasonable woman standard in a mere three cases. Although the numbers
tell an interesting story, we must once again point out that the volume

of cases using "reasonable" standards is too small to yield any statistical
significance.

44

142 See e.g., Bernstein, supranote 30, at 471 (noting that "female plaintiffs have arguably had [greater] success using the reasonable woman standard"); Toni Lester, The Reasonable Woman Test in Sexual HarassmentLaw-Mll It Really Mahe a Diffnrtme?, 26 LcD. L REv.
227, 229 (1993) (surmising that female plaintiffi are more likely to prevail under the reasonable woman standard than the reasonable person standard).
143 See Liesa L Bernardin, Note, Does the Reasonable Woman Exist and Does She Have Any
Place in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claims Under Title VIf After Harris, 46 FLt.. L
REv. 291, 322 (1994) (noting that recent decisions suggest that courts may be beginning to
follow the reasonable woman standard); cf. Elizabeth A. Glidden, Note, The Emigence ofthe
Reasonable Woman in CombatingHostileEnvironment Sexual Harassment,77 IowA L RE,. 1825,
1828 (1992) (pointing to the "innovative approach" some courts are using by emplo)ing
the reasonable woman standard).
144 In addition to the "reasonable" standard, we also examined the socalled "social
context standard" set out in Rabiduev. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986). In
this case, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs hostile
environment claim in part because the Sixth Circuit found that the plaintiff's "irascible"
personality was a sufficiently nondiscriminatory reason for her discharge. See id. at 615,
618. However, the court acknowledged that "the presence of actionable sexual harassment
would be different depending upon the personality of the plaintiff and the prevailing work
environment." Id. at 620. The "social context" standard takes into account both subjective
and objective factors and it considers the totality of the work environment coupled wvith
the plaintiff's reasonable expectations. Id. at 620. In discussing the "prevailing work environment," the Sixth Circuit quoted the district court's opinion ith approval:
Indeed, it cannot seriously be disputed that in some work environments,
humor and language are rough hewn and vulgar. Sexualjokes, sexual conversations and girlie magazines may abound. Tile VII was not meant to-
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Same-Sex Harassment

In 1998, the Supreme Court held that same-sex harassment is actionable under Title VII, 145 thereby resolving an issue which had divided the lower courts. 146 In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,

the Supreme Court held that Title VII's prohibition of discrimination
"because of ... sex" protects men as well as women. 147 Justice Scalia

noted that "nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination 'because of... sex' merely because the plaintiff and the defendant... are of the same sex." 148 Justice Scalia further reiterated that

Title VII only covers discrimination "because of sex.' 49 That is, "Title
VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace."' 5 0 Rather, the behavior alleged to be sexual harassment must
be shown to have occurred because of the plaintiffs sex.

While same-sex harassment is actionable, the phrase "same-sex
harassment" covers a range of behaviors. Professor Franke suggests
three categories of same-sex harassment. 151 The first category involves
a gay supervisor who seeks sexual favors from or creates a sexually
hostile environment for his male subordinates. 5 2 The second cateor can-change this.... But it is quite different to claim that Title VII was
designed to bring about a magical transformation in the social mores of
American workers.
Id. at 620-21.
A year later, the Sixth Circuit in Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987), held
that the plaintiff Tailed to demonstrate that she had suffered any "adverse employment
action" because she continued to receive the same salary and benefits that she had received before she filed her sexual harassment charge. Id. at 638. In reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit applied and espoused a reasonable woman standard for female
victims, id. at 637, thereby limiting the Rabidue "social context standard." Interestingly, despite this subsequent limitation, the "social context" standard was mentioned in ten cases
(or 2% of the cases in our study).
145 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998).
146 See Ervin Chemerinsky, DefiningSexual Harassment,TRL%, May 1998, at 86 (discussing the Oncale decision); Richard F. Storrow, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims After Oncale: Defining the Boundaries of Actionable Conduc4 47 Am. U. L. REv. 677, 678 (1998)
(discussing what constitutes same-sex harassment in federal courts); Deborah Zalesne,
When Men HarassMen: Is It Sexual Harassment, 7 TEMp. POL. & Cirv. R'rs. L. Plv. 395 (1998)
(discussing the interpretation of "sex" under Title VII and whether courts have been willing to read Title VII to protect workers from same-gender sexual harassment); Linda K
Davis, Note & Comment, When Is Same-Gender Sexual HarassmentActionable Under Title T7I?
Fredette v. BVP Management Associates, 22 NovA L. REV. 559, 559 (1998) (noting the
controversy in federal circuit courts over whether same-sex harassment is actionable); Corey Taylor, Comment, Same-Sex Sexual Harassmentin the Workplace Under Title V. The Legal
Dilemma and the Tenth CircuitSolution, 46 U. KAN. L. REv. 305, 305 (1998) (observing a split
in the federal courts that have evaluated same-sex harassment claims).
147 Oncale 523 U.S. at 78.
148
Id. at 79.
149 Id. at 79-80.
150 Id at 80.
151 Franke, supra note 30, at 696-98.
152 Id. at 696-97.
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gory includes a heterosexual defendant who exhibits sexual behavior
in the workplace in a manner which another male employee regards
as offensive.1 53 In this second set of cases, "the harasser engages in
sexual behavior that is designed to or has the effect of making the
plaintiff annoyed, uncomfortable... or otherwise victimized by the
defendant's conduct." 15 4 Oncale falls within this second category.'55
The third category encompasses "nongay hostile environment cases
where a man in the workplace is targeted for harassment of a sexual
nature because he fails to conform to hetero-masculine norms" and is
1 58
undertaken because of the plaintiff's gender identity.
We analyzed those cases with a male plaintiff to determine the
breakdown between cases in which a male supervisor engaged in sexually based behavior, a female supervisor engaged in sexually based behavior, and those in which Oncale "non-conforming" behavior was
present. Of the twenty-three cases in which we could categorize the
behavior, eleven involved a male supervisor engaging in sexuallybased behavior (the first category described by Franke). The remaining twelve were split evenly between a female harasser engaging in
sexually-based activity and one or more male harassers engaging in
"category two," Oncale behavior.

7

TAB
DisRICT

COURT CAsEs wrri-r MAILE Vicm

SEXUALLY-HARASSING
Type of Harassing Behavior

is

BY T

E OF

BEHAVIOR

Male Plaintiff Loses

Male Plaintifflins

Total

Male Supervisor, sexually based

6

5

11

Female Supervisor, sexually based

3

3

6

Male "nonconforming" behavior

6

0

6

15

8

23

Total
Pearson chi2- (2) = 9.8795

Pr = 0.043

As Table 7 shows, complaints brought by male victims against heterosexual harassers have been uniformly unsuccessful. By contrast, male
victims complaining of sexual harassment by either female harassers
or male homosexual harassers have been just as successful as female
Id. at 697-98.
Id.
155 The plaintiff, Oncale, alleged that while employed on an offshore oil drilling rig,
male employees subjected him to sexual abuse. Oncale alleged that the harassing actions
included the following- two employees restrained him while a third employee placed his
153
154

penis on Oncale's neck on one occasion and on Oncale's arm on another occasion; employees threatened him with homosexual rape; and, employees used force to push a bar of
soap into Oncale's anus. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118

(5th Cir. 1996).
156 Franke, supra note 30, at 766.
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victims. Despite the small numbers, the differences are significant at
the 5% level of significance. Given the gruesome physical attack in
Oncale, the leading same-sex harassment case, it is perhaps surprising
that overall male-victim cases are no more likely to involve physical
harassment. Only eleven of the twenty-seven male-victim cases (41%)
involved such harassment, compared to 44% of the cases with female
plaintiffs.
D.

Title VII and the First Amendment

Another subset of the recent literature concerning sexual harassment focuses on the interplay between Title VII and the First Amendment. 5 7 Two court decisions have spawned much of this debate. In
157

See, e.g.,

Stacyj. Cooper, Sexual Harassment and the Swedish Bikini Team: A Reevalua.

tion of the "HostileEnvironment" Doctrine, 26 COLuM. J.L. & Soc. Paos, 387, 420-34 (1993)
(arguing that court's invocation of the First Amendment to protect offensive speech overlooks women's compelling interest in the workplace and in society); Deborah Epstein, Free
Speech at Work: Verbal Harassmentas Gender-BasedDiscriminatory (Mis)Treatment,85 GEo. Lj.
649, 649-51 (1997) (arguing that anti-discrimination law withstands First Amendment scrttiny); Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom ofExpression in the Workplace and the Probhm ofDiscriminatory Harassmen4 75 TEx. L. REv. 687, 688 (1997) (questioning whether Title VII
unconstitutionally restricts employees' freedom of speech); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual
Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog that Didn't Bark, 1994 Sul. Cr.
REv. 1, 1 (describing the Supreme Court's failure to discuss the First Amendment in Harris
as "somewhat surprising" in light of the increased publicity about collisions between
speech and equality interests); Linda E. Fisher, A CommunitaianCompromise on Speech Codes:
Restrainingthe HostileEnvironment Concept, 44 CAmH. U. L. REv. 97, 98 (1994) (arguing that
"hostile environment" is a vague term in speech codes); Gary Goodpaster, Equality and Free
Speech: The Case Against SubstantiveEquality, 82 IoWA L. REv. 645, 646-47 (1997) (discussing
whether efforts at creating substantive equality by restricting racially or sexually discriminatory speech violates the First Amendment); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Workplace Harassment and the FirstAmendment: A Reply to ProfessorVolokh, 17 BERRELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 321,
321-22 (1996) (defending sexual harassment law as not conflicting with free speech
rights); Ellen i Peirce, ReconcilingSexual HarassmentSanctions and Free Speech Rights in the
Workplace; 4 VA.J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 127, 128-29 (1997) (examining the conflict between First
Amendment rights and sexual harassment law); Wayne L. Robbins, When Two Liberal Values
Collide in an Era of "PoliticalCorrectness": FirstAmendment Protection as a Check on Speech-Based
Title VII HostileEnvironment Claims, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 789 (1995) (advocating that Title VII
should not restrict political speech); Suzanne Sangree, Title VII ProhibitionsAgainst Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment and the FirstAmendment: No Collision in Sight, 47 RuTGERs L.
Rev. 461, 465 (1995) (arguing that First Amendment analysis can properly address Title
VII hostile environment issues); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Workplace Sexual Harassment
and Upholdingthe First Amendment-Avoiding a Collision, 37 ViL. L. REv. 757, 757-58 (1992)
(arguing that broader regulation undermines women's equality); Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedomof Speech and Workplace Harassmen 39 UCLA L. REv. 1791 (1992) (suggesting
that Title VII is a valid time, place, and manner restriction); Eugene Volokh, Thinking
Ahead About Freedom of Speech and Hostile Vork Environment Harassment,17 BERXLEYJ. ENSV. &
LkB. L. 305 (1996) (asserting that hostile work environment law is too broad and restricts
constitutionally protected speech); see also Peggy E. Bruggman, Note, Beyond Pinups: Workplace Restrictions on the Private Consumption of Pornography,23 HAs-rNiS CONsT. L.Q 271, 273
(1995) (arguing that "the government as an employer may restrict even private consumption of pornography for the purpose of ridding the workplace of discrimination"); Michael
E. Collins, Comment, Pin-ups in the Workplace-BalancingTitle VII Mandates with the Right of
Free Speech, 23 CUMB. L. REv. 629, 629-30 (1992-1993) (proposing an obscenity test instead
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Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,1 58 the court held that pinups and
pornography displayed in the workplace violated Title VII: "pictures
and verbal harassment are not protected speech because they act as
discriminatory conduct in the form of a hostile work environment."5 9
In 1992, the Supreme Court handed down a significant decision,
striking down a St. Paul, Minnesota ordinance prohibiting bias-motivated disorderly conduct as facially invalid under the First Amendment 160 The majority opinion distinguished the prohibitions of Title
VII as resting within the bounds of the First Amendment because Title
VII covers only "sexually derogatory 'fighting words.'" 16 1 However, in
his concurrence, Justice White applied the majority opinion's analysis
to Title VII and concluded that "[u]nder the general rule the Court
applies in this case, Title VII hostile work environment claims would
62
suddenly be unconstitutional."
The litany of articles and comments these decisions generated address two categories of expression: nonverbal expression, such as posters, pinups, or graffiti; and verbal (oral) expression. As discussed
above, our data demonstrate that allegations falling into the first category are rare. Plaintiffs alleged written comments or graffiti in only
6.8% of the cases and posters or pinups in 7%. In fact, only one case
in our database involves allegations of pornography and graffiti in the

absence of any other conduct, and the plaintiff lost. Often lost in the
debate surrounding Jacksonville Shipyards is the fact that the plaintiff
was the target of personal comments as well as denigrating comments
about women in general. When plaintiffs allege pornography or graffiti in addition to other conduct, they are successful a remarkable 80%
of the time.
E. Employer Liability
Employer liability has long held an important place in sexual harassment cases. In fact, it is one of the three most commonly cited
reasons by courts for finding that a plaintiff has not proven her
of Title VII to address the issue of pinups in the workplace); Aia 0. Wertheimer, Note,
The FirstAmendment DistinctionBetween Conduct and Content" A ConceptualFrarmewarrkfor UnderstandingFightingWordsJurispudence 63 FoDINt L REv. 793, 848 (1994) (discussing Title
VII and "fighting words").
760 F. Supp. 1486 (MLD. Fla. 1991).
158
159 Id. at 1535; see also Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Enironment
Harassment and the First AmendmenA 52 OHIO ST. LJ. 481, 495 (1991) (citing Jacsonville
Shipyardsas the first decision to impose liability solely on the basis of arguably protected
expression).
160 RAV. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).
161 Id. at 389.
Id. at 409 (WhiteJ., concurring).
162
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case. 163 Until recently, and primarily as a result of the Supreme
Court's ruling in Meritor,14 employer liability for sexual harassment
has remained the subject of much scholarly discussion 16 5 and judicial
variance. 66 Following Menitor, the lower courts unanimously agreed
that an employer was vicariously liable when a plaintiff demonstrated
a cognizable quid pro quo claim. 167 However, courts have less success-

163 The other two are that the conduct was not severe or pervasive and that the court
either did not credit the plaintiff's allegations or there was insufficient support for the
plaintiff's allegations.
164
Meritor Say. Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1985) (holding that severe and
pervasive sexual harassment that alters employee's conditions of employment is actionable
under Title VII).
165 See Joseph G. Allegretti, Sexual Harassment by Nonemployees: The Limits of Employer
Liability, 9 EMPLOYEE Rn. LJ. 98 (1983) (discussing employer liability); Maria M. Carrillo,
Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment by a Supervisor Under Title VII Reassessment of Employer
Liability inLight of the CivilRightsAct of1991, 24 COLuM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 41, 41-42 (19921993) (arguing for vicarious liability for supervisors); Cynthia Fryer Cohen & Joyce P.

Vincelette, Notice, Remedy, and Employer LiabilityforSexual Harassment,35 LA. L.J. 301, 301
(1984) (discussing employer liability for sexual harassment under EEOC guidelines);
Sheryl A. Greene, Reevaluation of Title VII Abusive Environment Claims After Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson, 13 T. MARsHALL L. REv. 29, 29-31 (1988) (discussing the standard for

employer liability after the Court's decision in Meritor); Mark McLaughlin Hager, Harassment as a Tort: Why Title VII HostileEnvironment Liability Should Be Curtailed,30 CONN. L. REv.
375 (1998) (advocating curtailment of employer liability for sexual overtures by coworkers); Kiesling, supra note 66, at 1, 1-2 (discussing the liability of "on-site" employers for
claims of a temporary employee under Title VII); DavidJ. Burge, Note, Employment Discrimination-DefiningEmployer'sLiability Under Title VIlfor On-the-JobSexual Harassment:Adoption of
a Bifurcated Standard, 62 N.C. I REv. 795, 795-97 (1984) (discussing the standards for determining employer liability); Nancy Fisher Chudacoff, Significant Development, New
EEOC Guidelineson DiscriminationBecause of Sex: Employer Liabilityfor Sexual HarassmentUnder
Title VII, 61 B.U. L. REv. 535 (1981) (explaining employer liability guidelines under
EEOC); MatthewJ. Cleveland, Comment, Title VII and NegativeJob References: Employees Find
Safe Harbor in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 31 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 521 (1998) (discussing
employer liability for negative job references); Lucy B. Longstreth, Note, HostileEnvironment Sexual Harassment:A Wrong Without a Remedy?-Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 21
SuFFoLK U. L. REV. 811, 811 (1987) (same); Christine 0. Merriman & Cora G. Yang, Note,
Employer Liabilityfor Coworker Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 83, 83-86 (1984-1985) (discussing coworker sexual harassment and advocating for
change so that victims are able to obtain judicial remedies); Michael D. hay, Comment,
The Harms of Asking. Towards a Comprehensive Treatment of Sexual Harassment,55 U. Cm. L.
REV. 328, 328-33 (1988) (discussing the history of sexual harassment as it has been recognized and defined by the courts).
166
See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 785-86 (1998) (noting the confusion caused by Meritor); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751-54 (1998)
(same). See generally Graham Penn, Comment, "BecauseI'm the Boss:" Employer Liabilityfor
Supervisors' HostileEnvironment Sexual Harassment, 51 FLA. L. REv. 373 (1998) (praising the
Supreme Court's decision in Faragherfor eliminating the confusion caused by Meritor by
providing a clear rule for determining employer liability for all Title VII sexual harassment
claims).
167 Faragher,524 U.S. at 790-91.
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fully agreed upon a rule for determining employer liability for an othenvise actionable hostile environment cdaim. 10
This confusion in the lower courts may account for the high number of cases that turn on the question of employer liability. Our study
shows that when an employer has a program that allows victims to

report sexual harassment, plaintiffs are successful barely one-third of
the time, far less than in other cases. Further, where a plaintiff has not
reported the harassment to a supervisor, either formally or informally,
plaintiffs lose 76% of the time. Thus, prior to the Court's decisions in
Faragherand Ellerth, the plaintiff's steps to report alleged harassment
and the existence of an employer program were paramount.
In 1998, the Supreme Court issued two important decisions on
the same day. These decisions identified the circumstances under
which an employer may be held liable for the acts of a supervisor
whose sexual harassment of subordinates had created a hostile work
environment. 16 9 In both cases, petitioners alleged that a pattern of
sexual harassment by supervisors created a sexually hostile working
environment. The Court based its determination of employer liability
on agency law;170 holding that "[a]n employer is subject to vicarious
liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environ171
ment created by a supervisor."
The Court simultaneously created an affirmative defense for hostile environment cases:
The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly
any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee
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In view of our finding of the importance of an employer program
and a plaintiff's reporting of the alleged harassment, the Ellerth and
Faragherdecisions will not significantly vary plaintiff success rates. In
fact, the two elements of the new Faragheraffirmative defense were
already critical to the success or failure of a sexual harassment claim.
CONCLUSION

Our method tried to objectively code all cases in a single area of
law-in this case, federal employment sexual harassment law. We
then examined the overall characteristics of the cases, using what we
have called the "sweep" of cases. This method differs from the standard legal methodology used in teaching and scholarship, which intensively examines the judicial reasoning in the leading appellate
cases, many of which are admittedly atypical. The disadvantage of the
traditional approach is that it disproportionately focuses on marginal
cases at the expense of the run-of-the-mill cases. This may assist lawyers in handling cases at the margin, but does not help them with the
typical case. Our method extensively examines the bulk of cases.
This method can jar traditional sensibilities, and lawyers are almost instinctively suspicious of its findings (unless they accord with
prior beliefs, in which case the method is boring). In some respects,
our sweeping empirical approach is like some of the newer multidisciplinary approaches to the law, such as law and economics, psychology, and sociology. These approaches are controversial in part
because they also tend to examine more cases less thoroughly and,
hence, also run up against the law's normal methodologies. In our
teaching and scholarship, we engage in a fair amount of what we Eire
calling "traditional" scholarship. Certainly we do not want to discredit
that enterprise. But we believe that examination of the sweep of cases
will provide useful antidotes to the tendency to generalize too far
from a handful of cases.
What does our study show? Like all empirical studies, many of the
findings confirm common sense or folk wisdom in the area. Others
are more surprising. Still others, we suspect, will elicit both reactions.
After reviewing our study, readers who have had no previous exposure
to a particular finding might be able to explain and incorporate such
findings into their own conceptions of reality.
Our study examines the sweep of sexual harassment opinions in
the federal courts. It is not a study of sexual harassment in the workplace, nor is it a study of leading cases. Rather, it explores the body of
sexual harassment claims with which judges wrestle, from which they
form their world views, and upon which they develop the doctrine of
sexual harassment law.
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We find that a disproportionate number of plaintiffs are blue-collar or clerical. Most work harassment occurs at work, but 20% of the
cases include claims of off-work harassment. Many more cases involve
mixed workplaces than mostly-male workplaces (and only a tiny handful of cases involve mostly-female workplaces). Most defendants are
private employers, but a disproportionately high percentage of cases
involve government employers. Almost 80% of the cases involved harassment by supervisors in whole or in part, while only 135% limited

their complaint to co-worker harassment.
Most cases (70%) involve solely a hostile environment claim, and
a substantial number (22.5%) combine hostile environment and quid
pro quo claims. Mostly-male workplaces tend to generate a disproportionate number of hostile environment claims while mixed workplaces
have relatively more quid pro quo claims. Blue-collar cases have a
higher proportion of physical harassment claims than do cases from
other settings. In cases where we could identify the duration of the
harassment, 44% involved harassment occurring for longer than a
year. Only 4% of the cases involved a single incident.
Successful cases are likely to involve sexualized conduct directed

at individual victims. Sexual harassment claims involving differential
but nonsexual conduct and conduct demeaning to women in general
are far less successful. Male victims comprise less than 6% of the
cases, and their cases are significantly less successful than cases
brought by female victims. Furthermore, complaints from mostlymale workplaces tend to be more successful than those from mixed
workplaces. Two critical factors for a successful case are: (1) that the
victim complained within the organization in some fashion, and (2)
that the employer had established no formal process to deal with sexual harassment issues. Thus, the prior case law had anticipated the
1998 Supreme Court case that articulated these factors as critical components in a sexual harassment defense.173

173

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
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APPENDIX A
BASIC

DATA ON SEX HARASSMENT OPINIONS

= significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% confidence level
PI = Plaintiff

District Court
Opinions

Variable

Appellate
Opinions

PI Win

PI Win
All Cases
Publication
Published in official reporters
Order not published; on line
Not published; on line
Missing/Can't tell
Public Interest Group Involved in Case
Type of Case
Quid Pro Quo only
Hostile Environment only
Both

Other/Missing/Can't tell
Site of Harassment
On work Premises

Off premises, work-related event
Off premises, consensual social
event
Off premises, nonconsensual
P1's Tenure at Employer
Less than 6 months
6-12 months
1-3 years
More than 3 years
Missing/Can't tell
Employment Status of P1
Not employed when EEOC charges
filed
Employed for EEOC charges, not
lawsuit
Employed when lawsuit began

Missing/Can't tell
Occupation of PI
Blue Collar
Clerical
Management
Professional
White Collar
Missing/Can't tell

Number
%
502
100%

Rate
51.2%

N
164

%
100%

Rate
39.0
**

263
36
163
40
8

52.4
7.2
32.5
8.0
1.6

56.7
50.0
42.3
52.5
75.0

126
32
6

76.8
19.5
3.7

45.2
18.8
16.7

2

1.2

22
347
113
20

4.4
69.1
22.5
4.0

72.7
51.3
46.0
55.0

7
129
27
1

4.3
78.7
16.5
0.6

433
49

86.3
9.8

50.1
49.0

151
20

92.1
12.2

41.1*
50.0

30
35

6.0
7.0

13
15

7.9
9.2

23.1
60.0*

44
44
101
190
123

8.8
8.8
20.1
37.9
24.5

9
18
37
65
35

5.5
11.0
22.6
39.6
21.3

44.4
44.4
51.4
38.5
22.9

314

62.6

70

42.7

44.3

47
53
88

9.4
10.6
17.5

16
22
56

9.8
13.4
34.2

25.0
36.4
37.5

171
131
71
56
21
52

34.1
26.1
14.1
11.2
4.2
10.4

54
54
24
19
4

32.9
32.9
14.6
11.6
2.4

88
4
145
265

17.5
0.8
28.9
52.8

21
45
12
3
1
5
415

4.2
9.0
2.4
0.6
0.2
1.0
82.7

9

5,5

44.4
40.7
41.7
31.6
50.0
0

24
1
79
60

14.6
0.6
48.2
36.6

50.0
0
40.5
33.3

8
10
6

4.9
6.1
3.7

25.0
20.0
50.0

1

1
84.8

100
40.3

Segregation of Workplace
Mostly male
Mostly female
Mixed
Missing/Can't tell
Race of PI
White
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Native American
Multiple plaintiffi/races
Missing/Can't tell

59.1
50.0
43.5
52.8

139
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District Court
Opinions

Variable
Number
Sex of Plaintiff
Male
Female
Both (at least 1 Male & 1 Female)
issing/Can't Tell
Sexual Orientation of P1
Gay
Straight
fissing/Can't tell
Marital Status of PI
Married
Divorced
Single
Single living w/ boyfriend
Widowed
Missing/Can't Tell
Relationship of PI to someone at work
No relationship
Yes, w/harasser
Yes, w/someone else
Missing/Can't tell
Type of Employer
Private
Federal Government
State or Local Government
Consent of P1
P1 never went along/expressed disapproval
PI gave no signals one way or other
PI sometimes reacted in kind
Mfssing/Can't tell
Type of Harasser
Supervisors or superiors only
Supervisors and coworkers
Coworkers only
Missing/Can't tell
Length of Harassment
Single Incident (One day)
Less than 6 months
6-12 months
More than 1 year
issing/Can't tell
Victim Complained Internally
No internal complaint
Yes, victim complained internally
Missing/Can't tell
Employer Antiharassment Programs
No program
General grievance procedures
Specific sex-harassment procedures
Missing/Can't tell
Supervisor Knowledge of Harassment
None before victim files extrnl chg
Yes, supervisor knew of harassment
Missing/Can't tell
Steps P1 took in Reporting Claim:
Told coworkers about harassment
Told outside friends
Told supervisor informally

%

PI Vin
Rate

Appellate
Opinions
N

%

P1 vin
Rate

27
464
9
2

5.4
92.4
1.8
0.4

44.4
50.9
88.9
50.0

7
152
5

4.3
92.7
3.1

14.3
39.5
60.0

6
124
372

1.2
24.7
74.1

16.7
51.6
51.6

1
51
112

0.6
31.1
63.3

0
47.1
35.7

66
17
40
1
1
377

13.2
3.4
8.0
0.2
0.2
75.1

57.6
41.2
37.5
100.0
100.0
51.7

23
4
10
2
0
125

14.0
2.4
6.1
1.2

47.8
50.0
50.0
0

76.2

36.8

152
27
15
308

30.3
5.4
3.0
61.4

54.0
48.2
33.3
51.0

73
10
7
74

44.5
6.1
4.3
45.1

43.0
30.0
42.9
31.1

367
20
115

73.1
4.0
22.9

50.7
45.0
53.9

106
11
47

64.6
6.7
28.7

41.5
27.3
36.2
0**

331
14
31
126

65.9
2.8
6.2
25.1

54.4
14.3
45.2
48.4

115
3
10
36

70.1
1.8
6.1
22.0

49.6
33.3
10.0
13.9

294
99
67
42

58.6
19.7
13.4
8.4

50.7
57.6
35.8
64.3

98
30
29
7

59.8
18.3
17.7
4.3

20
111
75
161
135

4.0
22.1
14.9
32.1
26.9

35.0
49.6
50.7
54.7
51.1

5
38
43
53
25

3.1
23.2
26.2
32.3
15.2

39.8
50.0
27.6
28.6
0*,
0
31.6
39.5
58.5
16.0

57
316
129

11.4
63.0
25.7

29.8
54.1
53.5

30
100
34

18.3
61.0
20.7

23.3
45.0
35.3

35
54
60
353

7.0
10.8
12.0
70.3

71.4
40.7
50.0
51.0

47
38
20
59

28.7
23.2
12.2
36.0

48.9
29.0
40.0
37.3

41
291
170

8.2
58.0
33.9

19.5
56.7
49.4

20
109
35

12.2
66.5
21.3

15.0
45.9
31.4

49
18
210

9.8
3.6
41.8

65.3**
66.7
57.1*

29
7
82

17.7
4.3
50.0

65.50*
42.9
48.8*

0
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PI Win
Rate

%

PI Win
Rate

N

233

46.4

56.2**

80

48.8

47.5**

9

1.8

22.2*

12

7.3

50.0**

457
32
13

91.0
6.4
2.6

121
33
10

73.8
20.1
6.1

35,5
57.6
20.0

470
16
16

93.6
3.2
3.2

130
15
19

79.3
9.2
11.6

39,2
60,0
21,1

157
63
282

31.3
12.6
56.2

95
11
58

57.9
6.7
35.4

39.0
63,6
34,5

81
25
4
1
391

16.1
5.0
0.8
0.2
77.9

28
3
1
1
131

11
10
472
9

2.2
2.0
94.1
1.8

98

19.5

60

Number
Complained formally
Someone else complained on P1's
behalf
Jury involved in case
No jury involvement
Jury involvement
Missing/Can't tell
Jury involved in Sex Harassment Claim
No jury involvement
Jury involvement
Missing/Can't tell
Request for Punitive Damages
No request made
Pl. Requests punitives
Missing/Can't tell
Reasonable Standard Used by Court
Reasonable Person
Reasonable Woman
Reasonable Victim
Reasonable Victim w/Pl's Features
Missing/Can't tell
Social Context Standard Used by
Court
Yes, Standard Used
No, Standard Rejected
None Mentioned
Missing/Can't Tell
Types of Sexual Harassment:
Oral comments about P: belittling
names (e.g., babe, honey)
Oral comments about women in
general: belittling names
Oral comments about PI: physical
appearance, sexual comments
Oral comments about women in
general; phys appearance, sex
comments
Pornographic descriptions
Offensive gestures
Written comments, like graffiti
Objectionable letters sent to P1
Posters/pinups in public areas
Sexual materials left in P1's private
space; e.g., desk, locker
Physical contact of sexual nature;
e.g., squeezing, pinching,
grabbing
Physical contact of nonsexual
nature; e.g., hitting
Less favorable treatment in work
assignments, conditions
Favorable treatment to employees in
sexual relations with supervisors/employers
Requests for dates
Requests for sexual favors
Grouped types of sexual harassment:
Plaintiff specific allegations
Physical harassment

Appellate
Opinions

District Court
Opinions

Variable

%

17.1
1.8
0.6
0.6
79.9

50.0
100.0
0
100.0
35.1

2

1.2

7

4.3

50.9
57.1

155

94.5

36.0

59.2*

45

27.4

62.2***

12.0

58.3

33

20.0

57.6**

244

48.6

57.4***

74

45.1

46.0*

89
42
27
34
25
35

17.7
8.4
5.4
6.8
5.0
7.0

61.8**
64.3*
51.9
70.6**
52.0
60.0

37
8

22.6
4.9

46.0
87.5***

9
8
12

5.5
4.9
7.3

66.7*
50.0
66.7**

25

5.0

68.0*

9

5.5

66.7**

210

41.8

59.5***

78

47.6

46.2*

43

8.6

62.8

17

10.4

70.6***

145

28.9

55.9

35

21.3

60.0***

17
100
149

3.4
19.9
29.7

88.2***
53.0
59.1**

7
53
54

4.3
32.3
32.9

42.9
56.6***
57.9**

426
224

84.7
44.6

52.8*
59.4***

140
87

85.4
53.1

44.3***
49.4
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District Court

Appellate

Opinions

Opinions

Variable

%

Number
Case covered by 1991 Civil Rights Act
Procedural Posture of Case
Pretrial motion on substnce of clm
Pretrial motion on procedure, evidence
Memorandum order after bench
trial
Motion for judgment notvithstanding verdict
Posttrial motions
Trial in Case
No trial; decided on pretrial motions
Bench trial

Jury trial
Both bench and jury trial
Number of Individual Defendants
0
1
2
3 or more
Missing/Can't tell
Remedies Awarded to Successful Pls:

Backpay
Attorneys fees

Injunction
Reinstatement
Front Pay

Nominal damages
Punitive damages
Costs to PI
Money judgment
Mean judgment when awarded
Who Appeals
Plaintiff
Defendant
Both

P Win
Rate

33

6.6

326

64.9

52.5

19

3.8

79.0

124

24.7

39.5

4
29

0.8
5.8

75.0
65.5

346
127
11
18

68.9
25.3
2.2
3.6

54.1
45.7
54.6
33.3

179
166
56
87
14

35.7
33.1
11.2
17.3
2.8

36.3
59.6
58.9
59.8
57.1

N

%

P1 Ain
Rate

34 cases
45
18
8
5
17
9
32
63
$70,883.72

121
30
13

* (**) (***) = variable significant at the .1 (.05) (.001) level of significance

73.8
18.3
7.9

27.3
73.3
69.2
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APPENDIX B
MEASURING OBJEC-rVT=Y OF QUESTIONS THROUGH KAPPA ANALYSIS OF
INTER-RATER AGREEMENT

We tested the objectivity of our variables by having two readers

independently code a random subset comprising about 6% of the
cases, and examining how closely they agreed. Under this "objective"
test, the best reader of a case is not the person with the most clever or
original or thoughtful analysis, but the reader who most often agrees
with others. In turn, the most objective variables are those where the
inter-rater agreement is highest.
As revealed in Table B-i, the coders agreed unanimously on four
variables, and agreed in over 90% of the cases on another sixteen variables. Indeed, in about two-thirds of our variables, the coders agreed
in over 80% of the cases.
Medical statisticians have long wrestled with similar issues of inter-rater reliability. They have developed a kappa statistic as a more
sophisticated measure than simply eye-balling the percentage of
agreement. In its original application, a kappa statistic evaluates the
degree to which medical professionals reach the same diagnosis when,
for example, rating mammograms as normal, benign disease, suspicious, or cancerous. If the raters guess randomly based only on population distributions, the likelihood of agreement can be calculated
and the kappa statistic equals zero. If the raters always agree, the
kappa statistic equals one. For intermediate levels of agreement, the
kappa statistic indicates the proportion between random and full
agreement. For example, suppose two raters agree on the results of a
six-sided dice 50% of the time. If they had randomly guessed based
only on the fact that each choice is 16.7% of the population, they
should agree 16.7% of the time. The kappa statistic for their 50%
agreement is 0.400, showing that .50 is 40% of the distance between
74
random (.167) agreement and full (1.00) agreement. 1
The larger the kappa statistic, then, the greater the degree of
agreement. It has been suggested 175 that the kappa statistic can be
interpreted on the following scale:

174
See generally2 STATA REFERENCE MANUAL RELEASE 6, at 132-43 (1999) (instructing on
the use of kappa statistics).
175 J. Richard Landis & Gary G. Koch, The Measurement of ObserverAgreement for Categori.
cal Data, 33 BIoMETmRcs 159, 165 (1977).
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Kappa score
< 0.0
0.00-0.20
0.21-0.40
0.41-0.69
0.61-0.80
0.81-1.00

599

Degree of Inter-raterAgreement
Poor
Slight
Fair
Moderate
Substantial
Almost perfect

Table B-1 groups our variables into these kappa categories.
Again, most of our variables hold up well. About half of the variables
we could test had kappa statistics greater than .5, meaning that the
coders were more than halfvay between random agreement and perfect agreement. This is regarded as substantial agreement. Importantly, most of our key variables show high inter-rater reliability. These
include the procedural posture of the case, the type of employer and
occupation of the victim, and many of the conduct categories.
When our variables are less objective, the problems arise mainly
from missing data. Our coders seemed to differ in how aggressively
they would mine the case for data. The variable "segregation of the
workplace" typifies the problem. The coding sheet asked coders to
choose between (1) mostly male, (2) mostly female, (3) mixed, or (8)
can't tell. Table B-2 shows their responses. The coders agreed in only
seventeen of the thirty-two cases, and the kappa statistic is a "slight"
0.1489. However, we take considerably more comfort in this table than
the summary statistics would suggest. The main problem is that Coder
I was more aggressive in determining the segregation of the
workforce, doing so in half the cases, while Coder 2 gave a substantive
answer in only one-fourth of the cases. Substantively, however, the
coders expressed near unanimous agreement. They both agreed that
no cases had mostly female, and they only substantively disagreed on
one case, which Coder 1 described as mostly male while Coder 2
called it mixed. In general, the substantive disagreement between coders for almost all variables was minimal.
Based on these results, we have considerable faith that our variables are "objective" in the sense that well-trained legal professionals
should reach the same answers in most cases.

600
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APPENDIX TABLE B-i
INTER-RATER AGREEMENT ON VARIABLES

Variable
Almost Perfect Agreement (Kappa=0.81-1.00)
Employer type (private/federal/state)
Physical contact of nonsexual nature
Favorable treatment to employees in sexual relations
Race of victim
Procedural posture of case
Was there a trial
Ruling on Hostile Environment claim
Substantial Agreement (Kappa=0.60-0.80)
Sexual material left in victim's private area
Sex of victims (female, male, both)
Tenure of victim at firm
Number of individual defendants
Marital status of victim
Did supervisor know of harassment
Offensive gestures
Oral comments about plaintiff: belittling names
Harassment off premises, consensual interaction
Physical contact of sexual nature
Case published (officially published/online only)
Victim complained internally
Length of harassment
Moderate Agreement (Kappa=0.40-0.60)
Type of claim (qpq/hostile environment)
Who were harassers (supervisors/coworkers/both)
District court ruling on Quid Pro Quo claim
Occupation of pl (e.g., blue collar, white collar)
Plaintiff told coworkers about harassment
Posters/pinups in public areas
Employer's harassment program (general/specific/none)
Plaintiff told supervisor informally
Requests for sexual favors
Plaintiff's Sexual orientation (gay/straight)
Oral comments about plaintiff. physical appearance
Number of harassers
Less favorable treatment in work assignments
Reasonable standard used by court (person/woman/etc)
Fair Agreement (Kappa=0.20-0.40)
Did Plaintiff request punitive damages
Consent of Plaintiff (e.g., sometimes went along)
Requests for dates
Was jury involved in case
Was jury involved in sex harassment part of case
Pornography in workplace
Pi's Employment status (employed at EEOC filing/etc)
Did victim have relationship at work
Harassment off premises, nonconsensual interaction
Slight Agreement (Kappa=0.00-0.20)
Plaintiff complained formally
Segregation of workforce (mixed, mostly male/female)
Oral comments re women in general: phys appearance

% of cases Kappa
agreed on Statistic

Probability
of random
rating

100.00
100.00
100.00

1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

93.75
93.75
93.75
87.50

0.8293
0.8140
0.8140
0.8112

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0,0000

96.88
96.88
84.38
83.87
90.62
84.38
90.62
87.50
93.75
84.38
81.48
78.12
71.88

0.7881
0.7867
0.7841

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

0.7630

0.0000

0.7618

0.0000

0.7407

0.0000

0.7280

0.0000

0.7211
0.7168
0.6899
0.5833

0.0000
0.0001
0.0000
0.0002

0.6216
0.6139

0.0000
0,0000

83.87
71.88
78.12
62.50
90.62
93.75
75.00
75.00
71.88
84.38
62.50
62.50
71.88
78.12

0.5856
0.5765
0.5564
0.5288
0.5200
0.4797
0.4733
0.4667
0.4617
0.4521
0.4402
0.4370
0.4364
0.4043

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0014
0.0001
0.0000
0.0020
0.0002
0.0050
0.0001
0.0000
0.0003
0.0011

71.88
62.50
84.38
90.62
90.62
81.25
71.88
75.00
81.25

0.3950
0.3836
0.3822
0.3806
0.3806
0.3469
0.3455
0.2809
0.2066

0.0011
0.0006
0.0023
0.0000
0.0000
0.0009
0.0034
0.0172
0.0274

59.38
53.12
68.75

0.1875
0,1489
0.0303

0.1321
0,1122
0.4103

2001]

THE SWEEP OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES

agreed on

Kappa
Statistic

Probability
of random
rating

87.50
87.50
84.38
84.38

-0.0492
-0.0492
-0.0596
-0.0811

0.6393
0.6388
0.6708
0.6807

100.00
96.88
96.88
93.75
90.62

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

% of cases
Variable
Poor Agreement (Kappa Below 0.0)
Oral comments re women in general: belittling names
Written comments, i.e., graffiti
Objectionable letters sent to plaintiff
Harassment occurred at work
Insufficient variation to accurately analyze interrater
agreement
Plaintiff told outside friends of harassment
Did court use social context standard
Plaintiff had someone else complain on her behalf
Public Interest Group Involvement
Harassment occurred off work, at work-related event
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B-2

LEVEL OF INTER-RATER AGREEMENT SEGREGATED WORKPLACE VARABLE
Coder 2

Coder I

_

Mostly

Mostly

Male

Female

Mixed

Can't Tell

Total

Mostly Male

1

0

1

3

5

Mostly Female

0

0

0

0

0

Mixed

0

0

3

8

11

Can't Tell

1

0

2

13

16

Total

2

0

6

24

32

Percentage Agreement (diagonal cells/total) = 17/32 = 53.12%
Expected agreement (based on overall probability distribution) = 44.9%
Kappa Statistic = [.5312-.4492]/[1-.4492] = .1489
Probability - .1122

